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I. INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 2003, the debate over same-sex “marriage”
captured the attention of the American public to an extent heretofore
unseen. In 1996, the Hawaii Supreme Court appeared to be on the verge
of redefining marriage in Hawaii,1 yet few people outside of Hawaii paid
close attention. In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court demanded that the
Legislature extend marriage-like recognition to same-sex couples,2 and
for the most part, only those in Vermont took notice. Two years later the
Dutch Parliament “opened up” marriage to include same-sex couples,3
though the first officially sanctioned same-sex “marriage” in recorded
history came and went with little fanfare in the United States. It wasn’t
until the summer of ‘03 that a major triad of marriage-related
developments struck close to home, converging to push same-sex
“marriage” to the forefront of American political and social life. The
media firestorm kicked off on June 26, 2003, when the United States
Supreme Court struck down a Texas law banning homosexual sodomy.4
While Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence both went out of their way to disclaim any direct impact on
marriage litigation,5 the potential implications were only thinly veiled.
As Justice Scalia bluntly criticized in his dissenting opinion, “Today’s
opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a
distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions,
insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”6 Numerous
commentators quickly joined the chorus, alternatively deriding and
celebrating the majority opinion as having paved the way for same-sex
“marriage” in the United States.7

1. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394 (Haw. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
2. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
3. Stb. 2001, No. 9 (“Act on the Opening Up of Marriage”) (Bill 22672) (Dec. 21, 2000).
4. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
5. Id. at 2484 (“The present case . . . does not involve whether the government must give
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”); Id. at 2488
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations— the asserted state
interest in this case— other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral
disapproval of an excluded group.”).
6. Id. at 2498.
7. See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, Next Step for Homosexuals Will Be Down the Aisle,
BALTIMORE SUN, June 30, 2003, at 9A; Michael Kinsley, Abolish Marriage; Let’s Really Get the
Government Out of Our Bedrooms, WASHINGTON POST, July 3, 2003, at A23; Gegax, Rosenberg, et
al., The War Over Gay Marriage, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 2003, at 38; Rick Santorum, Gay Unions: A
Matter of Rights or a Threat to Traditional Marriage? Americans Must Preserve Institution of
Marriage, USA TODAY, July 10, 2003, at A13; David G. Savage, High Court Ruling May Lead to
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The Lawrence decision landed upon a media market ripe for
discussion of marriage issues. Just two weeks earlier, the Ontario Court
of Appeals had found the Canadian marriage law in constitutional
violation and had ordered the Toronto clerk’s office to immediately
begin issuing marriage licenses to applicant same-sex couples.8 Even
closer to home, a decision in the case of seven same-sex couples seeking
marriage licenses in Massachusetts, then pending before the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, was expected at any time.9 This
trilogy of events, actual and anticipated, sparked an unprecedented
degree of media attention devoted to the marriage debate.10
More than a year before the election, same-sex “marriage” and civil
unions had already become a topic of conversation surrounding the 2004
presidential campaign.11 The presidential campaign of former Vermont
Governor Howard Dean quickly made same-sex unions a prime political
question, with all of the Democratic Party primary candidates endorsing
some form of legal recognition for same-sex unions,12 even as polling
data shows a majority of the general public opposed to both same-sex

Gay Marriage Rights; Both Sides Agree it Follows Logically, DAILY PRESS (Va.), June 28, 2003, at
A1.
8. Halpern v. Toronto [2003] C.A. 2159.
9. Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 14 Mass. L. Rep. 591 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002),
vacated by Goodridge v. Dept. of Publ. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
10. Cheryl Wetzstein, Gay ‘marriages’ ahead: Debate Stirs in the States, WASHINGTON
TIMES, July 13, 2003, at A1 (“For years, the issue of same-sex ‘marriage’ in America has surfaced
only occasionally, a topic of arcane conversation, and promptly slips away. No longer. High court
decisions in Canada and the United States and a pending lawsuit in Massachusetts will finally force
‘gay marriage’ to the top of the nation’s legal and cultural agenda.”). A rough statistical analysis of
the primarily print media sources contained in the Westlaw database finds more news articles
dealing with same-sex “marriage” this summer than in any month in the previous seven years. A
search of the Westlaw news database for the month of June 2003 revealed 1353 articles mentioning
the phrase “same-sex marriage.” In July and August, there were 1243 and 1688 articles, respectively.
The previous monthly high of 832 articles was reached in September 1996, as Congress adopted the
Defense of Marriage Act and a Hawaii court considered evidence in Baehr v. Miike. Most months
have seen between one and two hundred articles containing the phrase “same-sex marriage.” The
Baker v. State decision that gave rise to Vermont civil unions produced 255 articles in December
1999, and the effective date of the Dutch same-sex “marriage” legislation in April 2001 produced
just 126 articles in the Westlaw database.
11. See, e.g., Maggie Gallagher, Concerns Boil Down to Three Big Issues, MYRTLE BEACH
SUN-NEWS, Aug. 21, 2003, at 9 (suggesting that terrorism, the energy crisis, and gay marriage will
be the three big topics of the 2004 election season); Will Lester, Most in Poll Favor Gay-Marriage
Ban – Many Say They’ll Oppose ‘04 Candidates Who Defend Same-Sex Unions, NEWARK STARLEDGER, Aug. 19, 2003, at 4; Dick Morris, W’s Weapon Against Dean, NEW YORK POST, Nov. 5,
2003 (“In a Bush-Dean race, the contest would likely hinge on three semantic differences. The way
the electorate defines the gay marriage, tax-cut and Iraq issues will spell victory or defeat for the
candidates.”).
12. Mary Leonard, GOP Sees ‘04 Issue in Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 2003, at
A1 (“None of the leading Democratic candidates support gay marriage, but all are wooing gay and
lesbian activists and young voters with promises to fight a constitutional amendment, endorse civil
unions, and expand domestic benefits to same-sex couples.”).
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“marriage” and civil unions.13 A proposed marriage amendment to the
United States Constitution gained fifty co-sponsors during the month of
July alone, tripling its previous support.14 Polling data from throughout
the summer and fall of 2003 suggests that many Americans are still in
the process of forming, reforming, and solidifying opinions on same-sex
“marriage” and “civil unions.”15
As a nation, we have come face to face with the difficult questions
surrounding the definition of that social institution called marriage. As
many Americans now consider these issues for the first time, it strikes
me that a concise overview of the debate as it stands today, with some
reference to the history which has brought us to this point, may be
helpful to many.16 That concise overview is essentially what I have
undertaken to provide in this article, recognizing already that I will likely
fail on both counts. First, this overview will be longer than I would have
liked it to be, sacrificing brevity. Secondly, it will be shorter than it needs
to be, sacrificing breadth and detail. I trust the compromise will prove
somewhat satisfactory to the reader.
II. CURRENT CONTROVERSIES IN THE MARRIAGE DEBATE
To date, the marriage debate has largely been a counterpoint of
judicial action and legislative reaction. Since same-sex couples first
began to seek marriage licenses in the early 1970’s, courts have been
repeatedly called upon to interpret state marriage laws and evaluate their
constitutionality. In response to real or anticipated threats from the
courts, state legislatures have often adopted measures intended to
mitigate the likelihood of a judicial redefinition of marriage.17 In the
1990’s, this counterpoint saw marriage litigation in Hawaii, quickly
followed by the adoption of the first state marriage recognition (state
DOMA) bill in 199418 and the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)

13. Alan Cooperman, Sodomy Ruling Fuels Battle Over Gay Marriage, WASHINGTON POST,
July 31, 2003, at A1 (“In an unexpected shift in the electoral landscape, polls show that public
support of gay rights in general, and of ‘civil unions’ for same- sex couples in particular, has fallen
about 10 percentage points since the court’s June 26 ruling.”).
14. H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003). As of June 25, the measure had attracted 25
cosponsors. In the weeks following the Lawrence v. Texas decision, that number jumped to 75
cosponsors. As of November 1, 2003, the total stands at 96.
15. See, e.g., Associated Press, Polls Hint at Backlash After Gay-Rights Ruling, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, July 30, 2003, at 10.
16. Except as otherwise noted, the discussion contained in this article attempts to incorporate
developments occurring through February 2004.
17. See David O. Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Definition or Discrimination: State
Marriage Recognition Statutes in the “Same-Sex Marriage” Debate, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 3, 5
(1998).
18. 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217.
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in 1996.19 Today, 38 states have adopted marriage recognition statutes
defining marriage as a male-female union and declining to recognize
same-sex unions as marriages.20 In Alaska, a trial court opinion striking
down the state marriage statute prompted almost immediate legislative
response, resulting in the ratification of a marriage amendment to the
state constitution just eight months later.21 In Vermont, the court gave the
legislature instructions to guide its creation of civil unions.22 Recently,
the Massachusetts legislature weighed its response to the Supreme
Judicial Court’s recent decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health.23
While encompassing a wide variety of factual situations and political
realities, today’s marriage debate encompasses three subcategories of
disputes, each with distinct legal and social ramifications: (1) same-sex
marriage controversies, (2) disputes over marital benefits, and (3)
questions of interstate marriage recognition. While the definition of
marriage remains at the heart of the marriage debate both politically and
philosophically, recent litigation has emphasized marital benefits and
recognition, opening up three major fronts in the marriage debate.

19. Pub. L. 104-199, 100 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. §1738C
(1997)).
20. ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (2002); ALA. CONST. art. I, § 25; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101
(West 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-107 (Michie 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (Michie
2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208 (Michie 2002); CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2002); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (2001); FLA STAT. ANN. § 741.212
(West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. 19-3-3.1 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-3 (1999); HAW. CONST. art.
1, § 23; IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (Michie 2002); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212 (West 2000); IND.
CODE § 31-11- 1-1 (2002); IOWA. CODE. § 595.2 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (1999); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 402.040, 404.045 (Michie 2002); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89 (West 2000),
amended by 1999 La. Acts 890 §1; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701 (West 2002); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 551.1 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.271 (West 2000); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 517.01 (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (2003); MO. REV. STAT. § 451.022 (West
2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401 (2002); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; Nev. Question 2 (approved
Nov. 5, 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-01 (1960); 2004 Ohio
Laws 61; OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 43 § 3.1 (West 2000); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2000);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Law. Co-op 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie 2000); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-42 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201
(2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.020 (West
2000); W.VA. CODE § 48-2-603 (2002).
21. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super.
Ct. Feb. 27, 1998); ALASKA. CONST. art. I, § 25.
22. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999).
23. Goodridge v. Dept. of Publ. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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A. Same-Sex Marriage Controversies
1. Overview
In the United States, all 50 states and the District of Columbia
recognize marriage as the union of one man and one woman. Forty-two
states have explicitly enshrined this definition of marriage in their
statutory system.24 In the remaining eight states and the District of
Columbia, the definition of marriage is implicit from gender-specific
references such as “husband” and “wife,” or prohibitions on certain
incestuous relationships that presume a male-female definition of
marriage,25 and courts considering the marriage laws of these states have
uniformly found the existing marriage statute to contemplate only
opposite-sex couples.26
24. ALA. CODE § 30-1-19; ALA. CONST. art. I, § 25; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101; ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-11-107; ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109; ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208; CAL. FAM.
CODE § 308.5; COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101; FLA STAT. ANN. §
741.212; GA. CODE ANN. 19-3-3.1; HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-3; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23; IDAHO
CODE § 32-209; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/212; IND. CODE § 31-11- 1-1; IOWA CODE 595.2;
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 402.040, 404.045; LA. CIV. C. art. 89; MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701; MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 551.1; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.271; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01; MISS. CODE ANN. §
93-1-1; MO. REV. STAT. § 451.022; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; NEV.
CONST. art. 1, § 21 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-01; N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1, 457: 2, 457:43 (2003); 2004 Ohio Laws 61; OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 43 § 3.1; PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-113; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.001(B), 6.204 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4; VT.
STAT. tit. 15, § 1201(4); VA. CODE § 20-45.2; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.020; W.VA. CODE §
48-2-603; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101(2003).
25. See, e.g., D.C. CODE. ANN. § 46-401 (2003) (declaring incestuous marriages void ab
initio as between men and their female relatives and between women and their male relatives);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-21 (incest provision); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-81r (West
2003) (declaring that nothing in the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation should be construed “to authorize . . . the right of marriage between persons of the same
sex”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 1-2 (1998) (gender-specific prohibition on incestuous
marriages); N.J. REV. STAT. § 37:1-1 (2003) (gender specific prohibition on incestuous marriages);
N.J. REV. STAT. § 37:1-3 (2003) (reference to “male party” and “female party” in context of
marriage license application); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-1 (Michie 2003) (referring to marital
obligations in terms of “husband” and “wife”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 2004)
(statutory reference to “husband” and “wife” in context of divorce); OR. REV. STAT. § 106.010
(2003) (marriage entered into by “males” and “females” age 17 or older); OR. REV. STAT. § 106.150
(2003) (married spouses take each other to be “husband and wife.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-1-1, 151-2 (2003) (gender specific prohibitions against incestuous marriages); WIS. STAT. § 765.001 (2003)
(“marriage is a legal relationship between 2 equal persons, a husband and a wife”).
26. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185-86 (Minn. 1971) (decided prior to the
adoption of Minnesota’s statutory definition of marriage and concluding that the drafters of the
marriage law used “marriage” according to its common meaning as “the state of union between
persons of the opposite sex”); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 310 (D.C. 1995) (“The
language and legislative history of the marriage statute demonstrate that neither Congress nor the
Council of the District of Columbia has ever intended to define ‘marriage’ to include same-sex
unions.”); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 868 (Vt. 1999); Goodridge v. Dept. of Publ. Health, 14
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In 1979, Professor Rhonda Rivera wrote in a Hastings Law Journal
article that “[a] number of homosexual couples have tried to effectuate a
legal marriage but to date no court has recognized such a union.”27 The
same remained true for nearly 25 years, until a ruling of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on November 18, 2003 rewrote
the common law definition of marriage in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.28
Since 1971, there have been direct constitutional challenges to the
marriage laws of nine states and the District of Columbia that have
resulted in published opinions.29 Of these ten reported American cases to
litigate the constitutionality of male-female marriage laws, six simply
affirmed the marriage laws of the state,30 two (Hawaii and Alaska) were
preempted by constitutional amendments defining marriage,31 and one
court (Vermont) stopped short of redefining marriage, but ruled that
same-sex couples were entitled to marital benefits.32 As of this writing,
the end result in Massachusetts is still very much in question.33 A number
Mass. L. Rptr. 591, (Mass. Super., May 7, 2002), vacated by, Goodridge v. Dept. of Publ. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); see also Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. 2002)
(finding that Connecticut law does not recognize marriages between persons of the same sex);
Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 316 (Mass. 1993) (“the laws of the Commonwealth do not
permit [a same-sex couple] to enter into a legally cognizable marriage”); Rutgers Council of AAUP
Chapters v. Rutgers Univ., 689 A.2d 828, 835 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (concluding that
despite the absence of specific statutory reference, New Jersey law “strongly and firmly implied” a
male-female definition of marriage, such that a contrary legislative intent “cannot be fathomed.”); In
re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241, 250 (Ohio 2002) (Cook, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[T]he General
Assembly does not permit same-sex marriages. . .”).
27. Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual
Persons in The United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 874 (1979).
28. Goodridge v. Dept. of Publ. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
29. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for lack of substantial
federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Singer v.
Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (D.C. Cal.
1980); Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307
(D.C. 1995); Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996), appeal dismissed, 666
N.Y.S.2d 835 (1997); Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
30. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for lack of substantial
federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Singer v.
Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (D.C. Cal.
1980); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Storrs v. Holcomb (645 N.Y.S.2d
286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996), appeal dismissed, 666 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1997).
31. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394 (Haw. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 3, 1996); Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (giving
legislature authority to define marriage as union of man and woman); Brause v. Bureau of Vital
Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998); ALASKA. CONST.
art. I, § 25 (defining marriage as union of man and woman).
32. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
33. A constitutional amendment to define marriage as the union of one man and one woman
was debated in Constitutional Convention in the early part of this year. 2003 Mass. H. 3190. See
infra, section II.A.4.
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of additional cases have either been decided on procedural grounds, or
have been resolved at the trial level and have not produced a published
opinion.34 Four cases have been filed since 2001, three of which are still
pending as of this writing.35
Twelve of these 1336 marriage cases were filed in state courts,37 and
nine of the 13 cases have been litigated on the basis of state
constitutional provisions, with Baker v. Nelson,38 Adams v. Howerton,39
Dean v. District of Columbia,40 and Standhardt v. Superior Court of
Ariz.41 the four exceptions filing federal claims.42
In Baker v. Nelson, the first of the published marriage cases, the
United States Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the Minnesota
marriage law did not raise any federal constitutional issues, dismissing
the appeal.43 The Jurisdictional Statement filed in the case alleged that
34. See, e.g., Burkett v. Zablocki, 54 F.R.D. 626, 626 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (granting clerk’s
motion to dismiss as plaintiffs failed to respond to the motion); Irwin v. Lupardus, 1980 Ohio App.
LEXIS 12106 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 1980) (rejecting constitutional claims for recognition of a
same-sex common law marriage).
35. Standhardt v. Superior Court of Ariz., No. 1 CA-SA 03-0150, 2003 WL 22299701 (Ariz.
Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2003); Lewis v. Harris, No. 15-03 (N.J. Mercer Co. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 2003);
Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49A02-0305-CV-447 (Ind. Ct. App. May 28, 2003). Recent news reports
indicate several additional cases filed in February and early March 2004, including lawsuits in
California, Florida, New York, Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia. Dean E. Muphy, California
Court to Get Case on Gay Marriages; NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 23, 2004, at A19; Stephen Nohlgren,
State Ban on Gay Marriage Being Tested, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, at 1A; Mark
Larabee, Lawsuits Target Gay Marriage, THE OREGONIAN, Mar. 5, 2004, at A01; Jonathan Martin,
Same-Sex Couples to Sue Over State Marriage Laws, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004, at A1; Gay
Marriage Spreads to West Virginia, 365Gay.com, Mar. 6, 2004, available at
http://www.365gay.com/newscon04/03/030604wvaMarr.htm; Lambda Sues New York for Same-Sex
Marriage Rights, ADVOCATE, Mar. 6, 2004, available at http://www.advocate.com/
new_news.asp?ID=11576&sd=03/06/04-03/08/04.
36. Including the ten published opinions and the three pending cases.
37. Adams v. Howerton, the only exception, was an immigration case in which the plaintiffs
argued, in part, that the equal protection and due process guarantees of the United States
Constitution required the recognition of same-sex “marriages” under Colorado law. 486 F. Supp.
1119, 1124-25 (D.C. Cal. 1980).
38. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for lack of substantial federal question,
409 U.S. 810 (1972) (asserting rights of due process, privacy and equal protection under the Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution); see also Jurisdictional Statement at
3, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (No. 71-1027) (copy on file with author).
39. 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (D.C. Cal. 1980) (asserting federal guarantees of equal
protection and due process).
40. 653 A.2d 307, 331, 362 (D.C. 1995) (asserting a fundamental right to marry person of
one’s choice under Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment as well as guarantee of equal protection
under Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).
41. No. 1 CA-SA 03-0150, 77 P.3d 451, 454 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2003) (asserting
fundamental right to marry and guarantee of equal protection under both state and federal
constitutions).
42. Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health also contained a federal claim based upon the free
speech clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, but the claim did not figure
prominently in the litigation. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
43. 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
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the state’s failure to grant a marriage license to persons of the same sex
violated constitutional guarantees of equal protection, due process and
privacy.44 Though no written opinion was issued, the dismissal for lack
of a substantial federal question constitutes a substantive ruling on the
merits.45 Lower federal courts are bound to follow the ruling unless or
until the Supreme Court overrules it.46 This ruling obviously dampened
the prospects of future equal protection, due process, and privacy claims
made under the United States Constitution, and may (at least partially)
account for the fact that the majority of subsequent cases have relied
upon state constitutional claims.
Over the past three decades the concept of same-sex “marriage” has
become increasingly accepted in the legal academy, such that ideas
virtually unheard of prior to 1970 are now part of the academic
orthodoxy in many circles.47 Over time, this ideology has spread
throughout the legal profession, as prominent attorneys and bar
associations have shown increasing willingness to support the effort to
gain legal recognition for same-sex marriage.48

44. Appellants in the case presented three constitutional questions: (1) “Whether appellee’s
refusal to sanctify appellants’ marriage deprives appellants of their liberty to marry and of their
property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment”; (2) “Whether appellee’s
refusal, pursuant to Minnesota marriage statutes, to sanctify appellants’ marriage because both are of
the male sex violates their rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”;
and (3) “Whether appellee’s refusal to sanctify appellants’ marriage deprives appellants of their right
to privacy under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Jurisdictional Statement at 3, Baker v.
Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (No. 71-1027).
45. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975).
46. See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (D.C. Cal. 1980).
47. Prior to 1980, only a handful of articles even discussed the topic of same-sex “marriage.”
See, e.g., Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons
in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 874-78 (1979); Comment, Fundamental Interests and
the Question of Same-Sex Marriage, 15 TULSA L.J. 141 (1979); Comment, Homosexuals’ Right to
Marry: A Constitutional Test and a Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1979); Note, The
Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973). Even prior to 1990, a Westlaw search
reveals only 21 published law review articles that contain the phrase “same-sex marriage.” During
the next five years, from 1990-1994, 198 articles contained some reference or discussion of “samesex marriage,” and between 1995-1999, the number of new articles jumped to 849. A more detailed
review by the Marriage Law Project of approximately 150 published law review articles written on
the topic of same-sex “marriage” between 1990 and 1999 shows further that roughly seventy-five
percent of these articles favor the legal recognition of same-sex “marriage.” See “Bibliography of
Law Review Articles Relating to the Issue of Same-Sex ‘Marriage,’” Marriage Law Project,
available at: http://marriagelaw.cua.edu/Bibliogr.htm.
48. William C. Duncan, “A Lawyer Class”: Views on Marriage and “Sexual Orientation” In
The Legal Profession, 15 B.Y.U. J.PUB.L. 137 (2001). In the Massachusetts marriage litigation, each
of the amicus briefs filed in support of the plaintiffs was filed by a major Boston law firm, and
several briefs were filed on behalf of bar associations, including the Boston Bar Association and the
Massachusetts Bar Association. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Massachusetts Bar Association,
Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, Docket # SJC-08860; Brief of Amici Curiae Boston Bar
Association, Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, Docket # SJC-08860.
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2. Marriage litigation in the 1970’s
The first generation of same-sex marriage cases began when the
Hennepin County Clerk refused to issue a marriage license to Richard
Baker and James McConnell on May 22, 1970.49 Shortly thereafter,
Baker and McConnell filed the lawsuit that would ultimately make its
way to the United States Supreme Court as Baker v. Nelson, discussed
above.50 Each of the other three constitutional challenges to state
marriage laws filed in the 1970’s ended in a similar result, with one case
decided at the state supreme court level, one at the state intermediate
court of appeals, and one in federal district court.51
3. Marriage litigation in the 1990’s
During the 1990’s the outcome of marriage litigation became less
predictable. Of the five cases filed during the 1990’s, each ultimately
upheld the constitutionality of state marriage laws, though with three
significant caveats and only in the face of legislative and popular
intervention.
In Baehr v. Lewin, the eldest in this second generation of marriage
cases, the Hawaii Supreme Court shocked even the plaintiffs with its
1993 ruling that the marriage law constituted sex discrimination,
requiring application of a strict scrutiny analysis under the Hawaii
Constitution.52 On remand, the trial court entered a number of factual
findings that reflect the heavy burden of proof required under the strict
scrutiny standard imposed by the Hawaii Supreme Court:
Defendant presented insufficient evidence and failed to establish or
prove the legal significance of the institution of traditional marriage
and the need to protect traditional marriage as a fundamental structure
in society.

49. Jurisdictional Statement at 3-4, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (No. 71-1027).
50. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for lack of substantial
federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
51. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1974); Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (D.C. Cal. 1980); see also William C. Duncan,
Same-Sex Marriage Litigation: An Historical Overview, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 623 (2004).
52. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); see also, Andrew Koppelmann, Why
Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 209
n.40 (1994)
The sex discrimination argument had been such a uniform loser before Baehr that when
that case was litigated, neither the plaintiff nor the amici even bothered to make the
argument. . . . Nor was the sex discrimination issue raised by the court at oral argument.
The majority opinion therefore was a surprise to all the parties. Telephone Interview with
Daniel R. Foley, attorney for plaintiffs in Baehr v. Lewin (Apr. 19, 1994).
Id.
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***
A father and a mother can, and do, provide his or her child with unique
paternal and maternal contributions which are important, though not
essential, to the development of a happy, healthy and well-adjusted
child.
***
In Hawaii, and elsewhere, same-sex couples can, and do, have
successful, loving and committed relationships.
***
In Hawaii, and elsewhere, people marry for a variety of reasons
including, but not limited to the following: (1) having or raising
children; (2) stability and commitment; (3) emotional closeness; (4)
intimacy and monogamy; (5) the establishment of a framework for a
long-term relationship; (6) personal significance; (7) recognition by
society; and (8) certain legal and economic protections, benefits and
obligations.53

Finally, in its conclusions of law, the court wrote:
Defendant presented meager evidence with regard to the importance of
the institution of traditional marriage, the benefits which that
relationship provides to the community and, most importantly, the
adverse effects, if any, which same-sex marriage would have on the
institution of traditional marriage and how those adverse effects would
impact on the community and society. The evidentiary record in this
case is inadequate to thoughtfully examine and decide these significant
issues.54

From all appearances, by December of 1996 Hawaii was well on its
way to becoming the first jurisdiction in the world to officially recognize
a marriage between two persons of the same sex.55 Before the Hawaii

53. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17-18 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
54. Id. at *20.
55. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997).
It finally happened. On Tuesday, December 3, 1996, a Honolulu judge struck down a
Hawaiian law permitting only opposite-sex couples to marry, and Hawaii became the first
state to recognize same-sex marriages. . . . We can confidently predict that Hawaii will
recognize same-sex marriages, for while the trial court stayed its mandate pending
appeal, it is very unlikely that the decision will be overturned.
Id.; Daniel B. Foley, The State of Gay Marriage: Will Hawaii Lead the Way?, 20 FAM. ADVOC. 39
(Summer 1997) (“The Hawaii Supreme Court was briefed on the lower court decision in June 1997,
and the final decision, expected by year’s end, is likely to affirm the December 3, 1996, ruling in
favor of same-sex marriage.”) (Mr. Foley was counsel to the three same-sex couples who were
plaintiffs in the Baehr litigation).
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Supreme Court would again rule in the marriage litigation, however, the
oft-criticized reasoning of the court’s 1993 plurality opinion56 was
rejected by the Legislature and by the people of the state of Hawaii.
While the case was making its second trip on appeal through the Hawaii
court system, the legislature presented Hawaiian voters with the
opportunity to vote on a constitutional amendment which provided, “The
Legislature shall have authority to reserve marriage to opposite-sex
couples.”57 On November 3, 1998, Hawaiian voters ratified the
amendment by a 69 percent to 29 percent margin,58 effectively
terminating the litigation eight years after it had begun.59
While the Hawaii litigation was in progress, courts in New York and
the District of Columbia rejected constitutional challenges to the
marriage laws of those jurisdictions,60 and an Alaskan couple filed suit in
Anchorage.61
Moving much more quickly than Baehr, the Alaskan marriage
litigation also prompted a state constitutional amendment after trial judge
Peter Michalski granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on
February 27, 1998, applied a strict scrutiny standard, and ordered an
additional hearing to determine whether the state could demonstrate a
compelling state interest which supported the marriage law.62 In reaching
56. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A BOOK OF LEGAL LISTS: THE BEST AND WORST IN
AMERICAN LAW 182-84 (1997) (describing the 1993 Baehr opinion as one of the ten worst state
supreme court decisions in American history and “an affront to both law and language that well
deserves its place on the list of worst decisions.”); David O. Coolidge, The Hawai’i Marriage
Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning, and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19, 26 n.22 (2000).
In my opinion, the plurality opinion contradicts itself. In the first half of the opinion,
during its ‘due process’ analysis, the plurality operates from the historic view of
marriage, and finds the existing male-female marriage statute constitutional. In the
second half, engaged in its ‘equal protection’ analysis, the plurality switches the unit of
analysis from that of an individual entering a social institution, to that of ‘couples’
entering a formal partnership status created by the State.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
57. See H.R. 117, S.D. 1, C.D. 1, Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 1 (1997). On April 29, 1997, the
proposed Marriage Amendment was approved in the Senate with 25 Ayes and 0 Nays, and in the
House with 44 Ayes, 6 Nays, and 1 Excused. See 1997 HAW. SENATE J. 766; 1997 HAW. HOUSE J.
922, cited in David O. Coolidge, The Hawai’i Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning, and
Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19, 19 n.3 (2000).
58. Constitutional Amendment: Legislative Power to Reserve Marriage to Opposite Sex
Couples, Nov. 3, 1998, available at http://www.state.hi.us/elections/reslt98/general/ 98swgen.html
(p.004, middle column) (285,384 votes in favor (69.2%), 117,827 votes opposed (28.6%), 8,422
blank votes (2.0%), and 887 overvotes (0.2%)).
59. Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999). See also David O. Coolidge, The Hawai’i
Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning and Constitutionality, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19 (2000).
60. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Storrs v. Holcomb 645
N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996), appeal dismissed, 666 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1997).
61. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super.
Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
62. Id. at *6.

10BAKER.MACRO

582

5/26/2004 12:58 AM

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 18

his decision, Judge Michalski declared that marriage is “the recognition
of one’s choice of a life partner,” and held that article I, section 22 of the
Alaska Constitution guarantees this freedom of choice.63
In an effort to head off the threatened judicial redefinition of
marriage, the Alaska legislature quickly drafted a marriage amendment
to the Alaska Constitution, approving it in May, defending it against a
legal challenge decided in September, and sending it to the voters for
ratification in November 1998, just eight months after Judge Michalski’s
trial opinion.64 Meanwhile, in June 1998, the Alaska Supreme Court
refused to consider the state’s appeal in the Brause case,65 allowing the
litigation to go forward until Alaskan voters effectively foreclosed the
litigation on November 3, 1998, approving the Alaska marriage
amendment by a 68 to 32 percent margin.66
Of the five marriage cases of the 1990’s, Baker v. State came nearest
a judicial redefinition of marriage. In its December 1999 ruling, the
Vermont Supreme Court stopped just shy of striking down the Vermont
marriage laws, holding that the Vermont constitution required the
extension of “equal benefits” to same-sex couples, ordering the
legislature to create a system by which to provide marital benefits for
same-sex couples, and noting that future litigation may find that the

63. Id. at *1. Judge Michalski also suggested that the marriage law violated equal protection
guarantees, but rested his decision on the privacy analysis. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No.
3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). See also Kevin G. Clarkson et al.,
The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People’s Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA L. REV.
213, 218-224 (1999).
64. See Clarkson, supra note 63, at 214 n.2.
See S.J. Res. 42, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998). The final version of the
Amendment approved by the Legislature proposed to add a new section to article I of the
Alaska Constitution that reads as follows: “Section 25. Marriage. To be valid or
recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between one man and one woman. No
provision of this constitution may be interpreted to require the State to recognize or
permit marriage between individuals of the same sex.” The proposed amendment passed
the House by a vote of 28-12, see House J. 3785, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska
1998), and the Senate passed the amendment 14-6, Senate J. 4157, 20th Leg., 2d Legis.
Sess. (Alaska 1998). Between approval and ratification, the Alaska Supreme Court struck
the second sentence from the Marriage Amendment. See Bess v. Ulmer, Nos. S-8811, S8812, S-8821, Preliminary Opinion and Order, at 8 (Alaska Sept. 22, 1998), aff’d, Bess v.
Ulmer, Nos. S-8811, S- 8812, S-8821, 1999 WL 619092 (Alaska Aug. 17, 1999). On
November 3, 1998, the one-sentence version of the Marriage Amendment was ratified by
the people by a vote of 68% to 32%. See Cheryl Wetzstein, Gays Can’t ‘Marry’ 2 States
Say, WASHINGTON TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at A16.
Id.
65. High Court Declines Same-Sex Case, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 6, 1998, at D1.
66. Measure No. 2, “Constitutional Amendment Limiting Marriage,” Nov. 3, 1998, available
at http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/elect98/general/results.htm (152,965 votes in favor
(68.11%) and 71631 opposed (31.89%)); see also Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979 (Alaska 1999)
(affirming validity of marriage amendment); Brause v. Dep’t. of Health and Soc. Servs., 21 P.3d 357
(Alaska 2001) (rejecting unmarried couple’s claim for marital benefits).
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marriage itself unconstitutionally discriminates against same-sex
couples. 67 Perhaps in a compromise crafted in order to reach its
unanimous opinion, the Baker court carefully avoided any discussion of
the definition of marriage, ostensibly turning Baker into a case about
benefits only.68
4. Current marriage litigation
In a November 6, 2003 editorial, Detroit News editor and syndicated
columnist Deb Price writes:
As in real estate, the secret to success in any civil rights struggle is
three words: location, location, location. And a recent Arizona state
court ruling against a marriage-minded gay couple serves as a painful
reminder that those of us who are gay need to pick our legal battles—
and our battlegrounds— very carefully. That’s especially true now that
we are so clearly winning. . . . Lambda [Legal Defense and Education
Fund], the American Civil Liberties Union and the Freedom to Marry
Coalition have terrific ideas on how to change the legal terrain in your
home state.69

Over the last five years, these three organizations, accompanied by
the Boston-based Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD), have
played an increasingly prominent role in shaping the litigation effort to
achieve legal recognition of same-sex marriage. This role has included
the filing of strategic litigation in selected jurisdictions,70 efforts to
dissuade individuals from filing litigation in states that might prove
counter-productive to the national effort,71 and attempts to mitigate the
impact of litigation that threatens to impact the cause adversely.72
67. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999).
68. Id., discussed further infra, section II.B.2.
69. Deb Price, Gays Must Pick Battles Wisely, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 6, 2003
(institutional website omitted) (Lambda Legal is available at http://www.lambdalegal.org; the ACLU
is available at http://www.aclu.org; and the Freedom to Marry Coalition is available at
http://www.freedomtomarry.org.).
70. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dept. of Publ. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Lewis v.
Harris, 2003 WL 23191114 (N.J. Super. L., Nov. 5, 2003), appeal pending; Snetsinger v. Board of
Regents, No. 03-238 (Mont. Sup. Ct.).
71. Judy Nichols, Committed to Gay Marriage in Arizona, Couple Struggle with Suit to Wed,
ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sept. 1, 2003, at A1 (reporting a meeting in which representatives from the
ALCU, Lambda Legal, and the Arizona Human Rights Foundation met with the plaintiffs in the
Standhardt case, urging them to drop their lawsuit); Robert L. Pela, Here Come the Grooms: Local
Poster Boys for Gay Marriage Want It All, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Aug. 21, 2003 (In response to a
question about criticism the plaintiffs received in Standhardt for continuing with the marriage
litigation, Tod Keltner stated, “We’ve heard things like ‘We’d like to strangle those guys.’ There’s a
lot of concern with our court case because of the backlash, the implications, the expending of
resources in Arizona.” Don Standhardt continued, “And for that reason, we’re not asking any gay
group for anything, and we never plan to. We plan to do this on our own. I guess I’m a bad
[homosexual], but I didn’t know any of these agencies even existed. I didn’t know the Arizona
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In a joint advisory issued following the Ontario Court of Appeals’
decision redefining marriage in that Canadian province, Lambda, GLAD,
the National Center for Lesbian Rights, Freedom to Marry, and the
ACLU Lesbian and Gay Rights Project advised gay and lesbian couples:
For those who contemplate litigation as a response to discrimination
against their marriage, it is critical to remember that any legal case has
profound implications beyond the individuals involved. Please contact
the organizations below who have the most experience litigating on
marriage, civil unions and the rights of GLBT people and who have
definite thoughts about what, when and where litigation is and is not
advisable for taking our movement forward. Couples should absolutely
not race across the border just to set up lawsuits; the wrong cases could
set us back for years. We will be strongest if we work together.73

Since Baker, four additional cases have challenged the
constitutionality of state laws that explicitly or implicitly recognize
marriage as an exclusively male-female union. In each case, the lawsuits
have alleged that state constitutional provisions render the marriage laws
unconstitutional, while the Arizona lawsuit also includes claims based
upon the United States Constitution.
a. Massachusetts. The first and most prominent of the four post-Baker
cases arose in Massachusetts, setting the stage for the November 2003
decision which made the Massachusetts Supreme Court the first in the
nation to recognize same-sex marriage. In April 2001, the Boston-based
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD), an organization that
also served as co-counsel for the plaintiffs in Baker, filed suit
challenging the Commonwealth’s marriage laws on behalf of seven
same-sex couples.74 As in other cases, the couples satisfied all
requirements of eligibility for marriage except for the definitional
requirement of a man and a woman. The couples had applied for and

Human Rights Fund was around, I didn’t know about Freedom to Marry was there, or Lambda
Legal. And once we did hear of them, and we did call them, they were just so pretentious and
negative toward us, I just [wrote them off.]”).
72. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d
47 (Ga. Ct. App.) (No. A01A1827); Brief of Amicus Curiae Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App.) (No. A01A1827); Brief of Amici Curiae Gay
and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App.) (No.
A01A1827).
73. Joint Advisory from Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Lambda Legal Defense &
Education Fund, National Center for Lesbian Rights, ACLU Lesbian & Gay Rights Project, Freedom
to
Marry
(June
2003),
available
at:
http://www.glad.org/GLAD_Cases/
Canadian_Marriage_Joint_Advisory.shtml. See also Hayley Mick, U.S. Same-sex Pairs Advised to
Think Twice Before Marriage in Canada, CANADIAN PRESS, July 13, 2003.
74. 744 A.2d 864, 866 (listing Mary Bonauto of Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders as
co-counsel for the plaintiffs).
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been denied marriage licenses, giving them standing to challenge the
marriage laws.75
The complaint contained five principal allegations. First, the
complaint alleged that, in the absence of a statutory definition of
marriage in the Massachusetts General Laws, the common law definition
of marriage should be construed to encompass couples in a same-sex
relationship.76 The complaint then alleged that the marriage laws violated
three distinct sections of the Massachusetts Constitution, including
guarantees of equality, due process, and the right to pursue happiness.77
Finally, the complaint also alleged that the definition of marriage
violated the right to “intimate association” implicitly guaranteed, though
yet undefined, by the Massachusetts Constitution.78
Deputy Attorney General Judith Yogman coordinated the state’s
response, which took the initial form of an answer filed on May 11,
2001.79 On August 20, 2001, GLAD filed a motion for summary
judgment, to which the state responded in December 2001 with a
response and counter motion for summary judgment. Three organizations
also filed amicus briefs in support of the state’s motion for summary
judgment.80
On May 7, 2002, Superior Court Judge Thomas Connolly issued a
26-page opinion granting summary judgment in favor of the state, and
denying the plaintiffs’ motion. In the opinion, Judge Connolly focused
specifically on the plaintiff’s argument that the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780 guarantees a fundamental right to marry “the person
of one’s choice,” virtually ignoring their equal protection claims.81
The case was subsequently appealed to the Massachusetts Court of
Appeals and the state filed a motion for direct appellate review by the

75. Complaint ¶¶ 122-148, Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 591
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) (C.A. No. 01-1647-A).
76. Id. ¶ 153; Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 4,
Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, C.A. No. 01-1647-A.
77. Complaint ¶ 153.
78. Id.; Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 60,
Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 591 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) (C.A. No. 011647-A).
79. Answer, Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 591 (Mass. Super. Ct.
2002) (C.A. No. 01-1647-A).
80. Brief of Amicus Curiae Massachusetts Family Institute, Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub.
Health, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 591 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) (C.A. No. 01-1647-A); Brief of Amicus
Curiae Marriage Law Project, Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 591 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 2002) (C.A. No. 01-1647-A); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Center for Law and
Justice, Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 591 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) (C.A.
No. 01-1647-A).
81. Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 591, 2002 WL 1299135 at *5-*11,
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2002).
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state Supreme Judicial Court (SJC).82 Briefing at the SJC was completed
in December 2002, as numerous amicus parties added their briefs to
those filed by GLAD and by the State. Overall, eleven amicus briefs
were filed on behalf of the plaintiffs, with an additional sixteen briefs
filed in support of the state’s position.83 Oral arguments in the case were
held on March 4, 2003.84 The SJC customarily issues opinions within
130 days of oral argument, a practice that was waived in this case on July
14, 2003.85
As the first marriage case filed after the Vermont Supreme Court
decision in Baker v. State,86 Goodridge was intended to complete what
many regard as the unfinished business of Baker. Whereas in Baker, the
court awarded marital benefits to same-sex couples, the plaintiffs in
Goodridge expressly rejected marital benefits as an adequate remedy,
arguing that the status itself is a benefit of marriage, and that denial of
marital status results in less than full equality.87
On November 18, 2003, the court responded with a 4-3 decision,
concluding that the state’s definition of marriage was “incompatible with
the constitutional principles of respect for individual autonomy and
equality under the law.”88 In reaching this conclusion, the court wrote
that “[c]ivil marriage is created and regulated through exercise of the
police power,” describing the public role of marriage as “central to the
way the Commonwealth identifies individuals, provides for the orderly
distribution of property, ensures that children and adults are cared for and
supported whenever possible from private rather than public funds, and
tracks important epidemiological and demographic data,”89
After concluding that the state had discriminated against same-sex
couples “for no rational reason,”90 the four-justice majority redefined the
common law definition of “civil marriage to mean the voluntary union of

82. Application for Direct Appellate Review, Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 14 Mass.
L. Rptr. 591(Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) (Appeals Ct. No. 02-P-1162).
83. Appellants’ amicus briefs are available at http://www.glad.org/marriage/
goodridge_amici.shtml.
84. Cheryl Wetzstein, Court to Hear Suit on Gay Unions, WASHINGTON TIMES, Mar. 3,
2003, at A4.
85. Kathleen Burge, SJC Puts Off a Decision on Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, July 15,
2003, at A1.
86. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
87. Complaint at ¶ 31, Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, C.A. No. 01-1647-A, (seeking
“access to marriage licenses, and the legal and social status of civil marriage, as well as the
protections, benefits and obligations of marriage. . . “).
88. Goodridge v. Dept. of Publ. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003).
89. Id. at 954. The court then went on to emphasize the “enormous private and social
advantages” which flow to couples who marry. Id. at 954-55.
90. Id. at 968.
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two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others.”91 The court then
remanded the case to the superior court for entry of judgment, but raised
questions in the legislature, writing, “Entry of judgment shall be stayed
for 180 days to permit the Legislature to take such action as it may deem
appropriate in light of this opinion.”92
As the legislature weighed its options in light of the court’s ruling,
the Massachusetts Senate requested an advisory opinion from the court
on the constitutionality of proposed “civil union” legislation which
would make same-sex partners legal “spouses,” attaching all the benefits
and responsibilities of marriage under the law.93 With the 180-day stay
running and a constitutional convention scheduled for February 11, 2004,
the court moved quickly, with the same 4-3 majority ruling on February
3 that “[t]he [civil union] bill maintains an unconstitutional, inferior, and
discriminatory status for same-sex couples.”94
Meeting in constitutional convention on February 11 and 12, the
legislature failed to garner majority support for any single amendment
proposed, though 175 (of 200) legislators voted for some form of
amendment.95 When the convention reconvened on March 11, the
legislature gave preliminary approval to a “compromise” amendment
simultaneously defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman
and
creating
same-sex
“civil
unions”
as
the
legal
equivalent of marriage. Approval came despite the lack of majority
support for the measure, as strategic alliances both kept the amendment
alive and prevented a “marriage-only” text from advancing.96 On March
29, amid much controversy, the legislature rejected a last-ditch effort to
bifurcate the marriage and civil union provisions in the amendment,
passing the (marriage and civil union) compromise amendment by a final
vote of 105-92.97
The amendment must be approved again in 2005 before being placed
on the ballot for ratification by voters in November 2006. With the
court’s 180-day stay having expired on May 17, 2004, marriage licenses

91. Id. at 969.
92. Id. at 969-70.
93. In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566 (Mass. 2004).
94. Id. at 572. Alternatively, the majority opinion also suggests that if “the Legislature were
to jettison the term ‘marriage’ altogether, it might well be rational and permissible.” Id. at 570, n.4.
95. Massachusetts Catholic Conference, Joint Session 2004 Voting Analysis, Feb. 13, 2004,
available at http://www.macathconf.org/04jointsession1.htm.
96. Raphael Lewis, Accord Said to Lack Firm Majority in Gay-Marriage Fight, Lawmakers’
Votes Fluid, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13, 2004, at A1.
97. Rick Klein, Vote Ties Civil Unions to Gay-Marriage Ban, Romney to Seek Stay of SJC
Order, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 30, 2004, at A1.
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appear likely to issue to same-sex couples in Massachusetts,98 at least
during the interim period between May 2004 and November 2006. News
reports indicate, however, that Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney
and key legislators are considering various ways to postpone issuance of
marriage licenses to same-sex couples until after November 2006.99
It is not yet clear at this point whether Massachusetts will ultimately
break new ground in the full legal recognition of same-sex marriage fall
back upon the model of Alaska and Hawaii, where the people refused to
accept a judicial redefinition of marriage. In many respects, the Supreme
Judicial Court decisions have proven to be only the start of the marriage
debate in Massachusetts and throughout the United States. With a
proposed marriage amendment currently pending at the Massachusetts
Statehouse,100 and a Federal Marriage Amendment gaining support in
Washington,101 there is an uneasy tension as those on both sides of the
debate await the Goodridge decision, and wonder whether legislative
counterpoint will again drown out the judicial melody.
b. New Jersey. On June 26, 2002, seven same-sex couples filed suit in
Hudson County Superior Court alleging that the New Jersey marriage
laws violate the New Jersey Constitution. In contrast to many of the
marriage cases, the complaint filed by the five lesbian couples and two
gay male couples contained only two claims for relief – one under an
equal protection analysis, and the other under a right of privacy that
ostensibly includes the right to marry. The plaintiff couples are
represented by the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, a
national advocacy and litigation organization that claims to have spent
more than a year preparing for the lawsuit.102
Lambda’s preparation was evident in the three-pronged approach
that simultaneously pressed the concept of same-sex unions in the legal,
legislative and public arenas. In the legal arena, where other complaints
have adopted something of a shotgun approach, the legal claims
presented in Lambda’s lawsuit were narrow and focused, avoiding issues
that could distract from the main themes being advanced. These twin
98. A Massachusetts statute prohibits Massachusetts clerks from issuing marriage licenses to
couples from other states seeking to circumvent their own state’s marriage laws. Mass. Gen. Laws,
ch. 207, §11 (2003).
99. Rick Klein, Romney Warns of “Legal Limbo” Governor Eyes Timing of Vote, Gay
Marriages, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 14, 2004, at A1.
100. 2003 Mass. H. 3190 (“The Marriage Affirmation & Protection Amendment”).
101. Mike Allen & Alan Cooperman, Bush Backs Amendment Banning Gay Marriage,
WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 25, 2004, at A1.
102. Complaint, Lewis v. Harris (N.J. Hudson Co. Super. Ct., June 26, 2002) (on file with
author); Michael Booth, Gay Marriage Suit May Derail Push for ‘Civil Union’ Status, 169 N.J. L.J.
1 (July 1, 2002); Kate Coscarelli, Same-sex Couples Sue For Right to Marry in N.J., THE STARLEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 27, 2002, at 017.

10BAKER.MACRO

569]

5/26/2004 12:58 AM

STATUS, BENEFITS, AND RECOGNITION

589

themes of equality and freedom to marry have also formed the basis for
legislative deliberations on measures addressing domestic partnerships
and civil unions.103 Finally, in the third prong of its approach, Lambda
used the lawsuit and surrounding media coverage to launch a series of
“town hall” style meetings in which Lambda attorneys and lobbyists met
with interested citizens across the state.104
While Lambda and others have worked to develop grassroots
receptivity to same-sex unions among New Jersey residents, the litigation
has proceeded slowly, giving activists on both sides of the issue
opportunity to educate and persuade the general public. At the time of
the initial complaint, the state filed no response, and Lambda
subsequently amended its complaint on October 9, 2002, releasing the
local registrars of vital statistics who had been named in the initial
complaint and naming only state officials as defendants.105 On November
22, 2002, a consent order transferred venue to Mercer County, the
customary venue for lawsuits naming the state as defendant.106
On February 24, 2003, Deputy Attorney General Patrick DeAlmeida,
acting on behalf of the defendants, moved to dismiss the complaint.107
More than ten weeks later, on May 8, 2003, Lambda filed its brief in
opposition to the motion to dismiss,108 and Judge Linda Feinberg set a
hearing for June 27, 2003. At the hearing, Judge Feinberg converted the
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, and requested
further briefing.109
Shortly after the case was transferred to Mercer County, three
separate groups filed coordinated applications to intervene in the
litigation.110 On May 31, 2003, Judge Feinberg denied each of the

103. 2003 NJ A.3743 (domestic partnerships); 2003 NJ A3762 (civil unions).
104. Johanna Duerr, Town Meeting on Gay Unions, Couples Rights Held in Cape May, PRESS
OF ATLANTIC CITY, May 7, 2003 (describing series of 10 town meetings held in support of marriage
litigation and legislative measures).
105. Brief of Defendants in Support of their Motion to Dismiss at 3, Lewis v. Harris, No. 1503 (N. J. Mercer Co. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2003).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Brief of Plaintiffs in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Lewis v. Harris, No.
15-03 (N.J. Mercer Co. Super. Ct.).
109. See Michelle Han, Gay Couples Fight in Court for Right to Marry; State Argues That
Debate Belongs in Legislature, NEW JERSEY RECORD, June 28, 2003, at A3.
110. The first group consisted of state legislators, represented by lawyers from the American
Family Association, a national pro-family organization based in Mississippi. The legislators argued
that they had a constitutional duty to establish public policy for the state of New Jersey, and that the
litigation threatened their ability to fulfill that responsibility. See Opinion at 3, Lewis v. Harris, No.
15-03 (N.J. Mercer Co. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 2003). A second group of taxpayers, married couples, and
local pro-family organizations argued that the litigation would impair their interest in marriage, as it
currently exists. Id. Finally, a business owner also sought to intervene, arguing that the outcome of
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motions to intervene, finding the applicants to have failed to satisfy a
four-part test required for intervention of right.111 Particularly, Judge
Feinberg noted, and the attorney for the legislators also conceded, that
the Attorney General’s office had presented an adequate representation
of the case, at least up to the point of the hearing.112 In denying the
motions to intervene, Judge Feinberg granted each of the three groups of
applicants amicus curiae status.113
On November 5, 2003, 16 months after the filing of the initial
complaint, Judge Feinberg released a 71-page opinion granting the
state’s motion for summary judgment. In her opinion, Judge Feinberg
rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that a right of same-sex “marriage” is
guaranteed in the New Jersey Constitution, and concluded that the
definition of marriage is a matter best left to the New Jersey Legislature,
noting that “courts will not second-guess the Legislature’s policy
decisions regarding economic, social and philosophical issues.”114 The
case is currently pending on appeal.115
c. Indiana. On July 15, 2002, Marion County Superior Court Judge
Cynthia Ayers rejected an equal protection challenge to a state personnel
policy that did not include domestic partners under its spousal benefits
coverage.116 In her opinion, Judge Ayers concluded that the definition of
marriage was at the heart of the benefits complaint, stating, “It is clear
that the plaintiff’s attack here is not on the funeral leave policy, but
rather on the marriage statute and its preclusion of same-sex
marriages.”117 Five weeks later, the Indiana Civil Liberties Union
(ICLU), representing the plaintiff in the benefits case, also filed a
challenge to the Indiana marriage statute. The ICLU suit was filed on
behalf of three same-sex couples in Marion County Superior Court,
seeking to compel the clerks of Marion County and neighboring
Hendricks County to issue them marriage licenses.118 Alternatively, the

the litigation could impact his employee personnel policies, insurance premiums, and conflict with
his religious beliefs. Id.
111. Id. at 3 n.1.
112. Kathy Barrett Carter, Groups Denied Say in Suit on Gay Unions, THE STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, NJ), Apr. 1, 2003, at 15 (audio recording of hearing on file with author).
113. Opinion at 3 n.1, Lewis v. Harris, No. 15-03 (N.J. Mercer Co. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 2003).
114. Id. at 5.
115. Michael Ann Knotts, Appeal Ahead on Same-Sex Marriage Ban, 12 N.J. LAW.: WKLY
NEWSPAPER 2149 (Nov. 10, 2003); Mary P. Gallagher, et al, Never Enough, 174 N.J.L.J 1111 (Dec.
29, 2003) (noting that notice of appeal was filed on Dec. 22, 2003).
116. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Entry of Summary Judgment, Cornell v.
Hamilton, No. 49D04-0002-CP-180 (Ind. Marion Super. Ct. July 15, 2002).
117. Id. at Conclusions of Law ¶ 16.
118. Complaint at 11, Request for Relief ¶ 1, Morrison v. O’Bannon, No. 49D11-0208-PL1415 (Ind. Marion Super. Ct. (filed Aug. 22, 2002)).
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couples, each of which has obtained a civil union license in Vermont,
argued that the court should recognize them as “spouses” because of
their legal status under Vermont law.119
The Indiana Attorney General then intervened to defend the marriage
statute, and, on January 3, 2003, moved to dismiss the lawsuit for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Indiana Trial Rules.120 The memo filed in
support of the motion to dismiss argued that the plaintiffs’ allegations
regarding the tax code were outside the jurisdiction of the superior court,
that the constitutional claims were without merit, and that federal rules of
comity and Full Faith and Credit did not require an Indiana court to
extend legal recognition to the plaintiffs’ “civil unions” entered into
pursuant to Vermont law.121
Before responding to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs amended their
complaint for a second time, dropping their claim for civil union
recognition.122 Following oral argument, Judge S.K. Reid reserved
judgment, subsequently dismissing the complaint on May 7, 2003.123 In
her order, Judge Reid found several state interests sufficient to justify the
Indiana statute124 defining marriage as a male-female union. These
interests included: (1) “encouraging procreation to occur in a context
where both biological parents are present to raise the child,”125 (2)
“promoting the traditional family as the basic living unit of our free
society,”126 identifying a societal significance of the biological family,
and (3) the reflexive interest in “protecting the integrity of traditional
marriage,”127 recognizing marriage as an objective and independent
social good.
The case has been appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals, where
the case is currently pending.128

119. Id. at 11, Request for Relief ¶ 2.
120. Defendants’ Rule 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss, Morrison v. Sadler, No.
49D11-0208-PL-1415 (Ind. Marion Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2003).
121. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Morrison v. Sadler, No.
49D11-0208-PL-1415 (Ind. Marion Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2003).
122. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49D11-0208-PL-1415
(Ind. Marion Super. Ct. (filed Feb. 3, 2003)).
123. Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49D13-02110-PL-001946 (Ind. Marion Super. Ct.).
124. IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (2003).
125. Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49D11-0208-PL-1415, slip op. ¶ 17 (Ind. Marion Super. Ct.,
May 7, 2003).
126. Id. ¶ 23.
127. Id. ¶ 27.
128. Unlike previous marriage cases, the Morrison litigation has attracted little amicus
attention. At the Indiana Court of Appeals, there were no amicus briefs filed in support of the
Appellants, and only four briefs in support of the State.
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d. Arizona. On July 7, 2003, two Arizona men filed a special action in
the Arizona Court of Appeals seeking an order to compel the Superior
Court to award them a marriage license.129 After the United States
Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas,130 handed down on June
26, 2003, Mr. Harold Standhardt and Mr. Tod Keltner jointly applied for
a marriage license from the Maricopa County Clerk. When the clerk
denied the application, the two men circumvented the trial court, taking
the unusual step of filing directly in the Court of Appeals.131
Substantively, their complaint alleges that both the Arizona and United
States Constitutions guarantee a right to marry another person of the
same sex as a corollary of the constitutional guarantee of privacy
articulated in Lawrence v. Texas.132 The complaint also invoked the equal
protection guarantee of the federal constitution and the equal privileges
and immunities guarantee of the Arizona Constitution.133
News reports note that Standhardt and Keltner have resisted pressure
from national gay rights groups urging them to withdraw their lawsuit.
The pressure is based in strategic concern that litigation in Arizona
would not advance a national strategy toward the recognition of samesex marriage.134 Consistent with this approach, the American Civil
Liberties Union filed an amicus brief urging the Arizona Court of
Appeals to refuse to hear the case, but to no avail.135
The Attorney General’s office136 argued strongly that there is no
fundamental constitutional right to same-sex “marriage” under either the
state or federal constitutions, that marriage statutes do not violate
129. Petition for Special Action, Standhardt v. Superior Court of Ariz., 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003) (No. 1 CA-SA 03-0150) (July 7, 2003).
130. 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003).
131. Petition for Special Action, Standhardt v. Superior Court of Ariz., 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003) (No. 1 CA-SA 03-0150) (Petition for Special Action filed July 7, 2003).
132. Id. at 4 (“In Lawrence v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court succinctly recognized
that gay persons have a fundamental privacy right to marry.” (citations omitted)).
133. Id. at 6.
134. See, e.g., Judy Nichols, Committed to Gay Marriage in Arizona, Couple Struggle with
Suit to Wed, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sept. 1, 2003, at A1
(“[The plaintiffs] are walking the Arizona road virtually alone, without help from local
and national organizations who say they support the cause. In fact, the groups tried to get
the men to drop the lawsuit because they believe Arizona is the wrong place and this is
the wrong time to raise the issue of same-sex marriage.”).
135. Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona and American Civil
Liberties Union, Standhardt v. Superior Court of Ariz., 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 1
CA-SA 03-0150).
136. As in New Jersey, a state legislator unsuccessfully attempted to intervene in the litigation
and was granted amicus status. The amicus brief filed by the Alliance Defense Fund on behalf of
State Senator Mark Anderson reinforced many of the arguments put forward in the Attorney
General’s response. Response to Special Action Petition by Intervenor-Respondent Senator Mark
Anderson, Standhardt v. Superior Court of Ariz., 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 1 CA-SA
03-0150).
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guarantees of equal protection, and that the state has a legitimate interest
in linking procreation to childrearing, such that children are being raised
by their own biological parents whenever possible.137
On October 8, 2003, a three-judge panel of the Arizona Court of
Appeals unanimously affirmed the constitutionality of the Arizona
marriage law, rejecting both the state and federal constitutional claims
made by Standhardt and Keltner. 138 Though having come and
(apparently) gone without attracting national media attention, the
Standhardt opinion is nonetheless significant in at least two respects.139
First, and perhaps most significantly, Standhardt makes the Arizona
Court of Appeals the first court to have considered the Supreme Court’s
Lawrence v. Texas decision in the context of same-sex “marriage.” After
a summer full of speculation as to how Lawrence would impact the
marriage debate, the Arizona Court of Appeals was given first
opportunity for an official interpretation. Plaintiffs’ claim that Lawrence
implicitly created a fundamental right to marry a partner of the same-sex
was based in language from the Lawrence decision stating:
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), the Court reaffirmed the
substantive force of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.
The Casey decision again confirmed that our laws and tradition afford
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. Id., at 851, 112 S.Ct. 2791. In explaining the respect the
Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making these
choices, we stated as follows: “These matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.” Ibid. Persons in a homosexual relationship
may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons
do.140

137. State’s Response to Petition for Special Action at 37, Standhardt v. Superior Court of
Ariz., 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 1 CA-SA 03-0150) (quoting Lynn D. Wardle,
“Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital
Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771 (2001); Maggie Gallagher, What is Marriage For?
The Public Purposes of Marriage Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 773 (2002)).
138. Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
139. Plaintiffs have reportedly filed a cert petition with the Arizona Supreme Court. Judy
Nichols, Appeal Likely Today on Gay-Marriage Ban, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 8, 2003, at B1.
140. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2481-82 (emphasis added by Arizona court).
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The Arizona court concluded that this language does not set forth a
fundamental right to enter into same-sex marriages, giving three reasons
for its conclusion.141 First, the court noted that elsewhere in the Lawrence
decision, the Supreme Court explicitly held that its decision “[did] not
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”142 Secondly, the
Arizona court concluded that “these purposes” described by the Supreme
Court in Lawrence referred back to the Casey quotation, establishing a
right of homosexual persons to make “‘intimate and personal choices’
that reflect ‘one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life’ free from government compulsion.”143
Finally, the Arizona court noted that the Lawrence decision did not
declare sexual activity between persons of the same sex to be a
fundamental right, applying the rational basis test in striking down the
Texas statute.144 In the absence of a clearly established fundamental right
to sexual activity, the Arizona court was unable to find a fundamental
right to same-sex marriage.145
The Standhardt decision is also significant in that the court
recognized the state’s interest in “encouraging procreation and childrearing within the stable environment traditionally associated with
marriage.”146 In its opinion, the Court of Appeals adopted the State’s
argument that the benefits and responsibilities linked to marriage
communicate the state’s concern that men and women undertake a
commitment to each other for the good of the children that they
produce.147 While acknowledging that not all married couples have
children, the Court nonetheless held the marriage statute a reasonable
effort to further the link between marriage, procreation and
childrearing.148
The court also addressed plaintiffs’ equal protection arguments,
briefly noting that the Arizona marriage law “furthers a proper legislative
end and was not enacted simply to make same-sex couples unequal to
everyone else,”149 distinguishing the Arizona marriage statute from the
Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans.150
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 456-57.
Id. at 456 (quoting Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2484).
Id. at 457 (quoting Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2481-82).
Id. at 457.
Id.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462-63.
Id.
Id. at 465
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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5. Marriage legislation
Since 1994, state legislatures across the nation have considered
marriage recognition (DOMA) legislation that has now been adopted in
38 states.151 Over the past three years, however, the legislative debate has
begun to shift, as advocates of same-sex marriage have introduced samesex marriage legislation in several states and proponents of traditional
marriage have, at least in part, turned their attention to state and federal
constitutional amendments.152 In the 2001 legislative session, same-sex
marriage bills were introduced in three states (Connecticut, New York
and Rhode Island),153 a number which climbed to five states in the 2003
session (Connecticut, New York, Rhode Island, Montana, and
Massachusetts).154
Though few of these measures have even received a legislative
hearing, they still play an important strategic role in the campaign for
same-sex marriage. As the sponsors of such legislation often explain,
even in defeat the proposed legislation serves a long-term educational
purpose, providing a context in which to discuss the topic of same-sex
marriage with legislative colleagues and the general public.155 In
addition, such measures may triangulate state DOMA measures, creating
a safe haven of passive neutrality for undecided legislators hesitant to
take sides on a controversial issue.
Following the Massachusetts marriage decision, legislators in at least
18 states quickly introduced marriage amendments to their state
constitutions in an effort to foreclose the possibility of similar litigation
in their states.156

151. See supra note 21.
152. Though beyond the scope of this article, same-sex marriage legislation has recently been
adopted in two European nations: Netherlands and Belgium. Stb. 2001, No. 9 (“Act on the Opening
Up of Marriage”) (Bill 22672) (Dec. 21, 2000); Associated Press, Belgium Votes to Recognize Gay
Marriages, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 31, 2003, at 6. In November 2002, Statistics Netherlands, the
official Dutch statistics agency, reported that “[s]ame-sex couples do not seem to be very interested
in marriage,” after finding that only 10% of the Netherlands’ estimated 50,000 same-sex couples had
married during the first 18 months after the new marriage law took effect. Press release, “More
Marriages and More Partnerships,” Statistics Netherlands, Nov. 27, 2002.
153. 2001 Conn. A.B. 6032; 2001 N.Y. S.B. 1205; 2001 R.I. H.B. 5608.
154. 2003 Conn. H.B. 6389; 2003 Mass. H.B. 3677; 2003 Mont. H.B. 607; 2003 N.Y. A.
7392; 2003 R.I. H.B. 5861; 2003 R.I. S.B. 496.
155. See, e.g., Cheryl Wetzstein, California Gay-Union Bill Pulled; Family Advocates Apply
Pressure, WASHINGTON TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at A10 (quoting California Assemblyman Paul Koretz
after withdrawal of his domestic partnership bill: “I’ll be here for at least five years. These same-sex
families are here to stay. This issue is here to stay. And whether it’s this year or next year, the bill
will be back.”).
156. See, e.g., 2004 Al. H.B. 8; 2004 Ariz. Sen. Con. Res. 1015; 2003 Ga. Sen. Res. 595; 2004
Id. H.J.Res. 9; 2004 Ill. H.C.A. 24 [couldn’t find]; 2004 Ind. Sen. J. Res. 7; 2004 Iowa Sen. J. Res.
2002; 2003 Kan. H.Con.Res. 5033; 2004 Ky. H.B. 95; 2003 Mass. H. 3190; 2004 Md. S.B. 673;
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Significant as these state efforts are to the future of the marriage
debate, state legislative efforts have been recently overshadowed by U.S.
House Joint Resolution 56, proposing a marriage amendment to the
United States Constitution.157 The Federal Marriage Amendment was
introduced in Congress on May 21, 2003, and had 115 co-sponsors as of
March 1, 2004.158 An identical proposal introduced in the Senate on
November 25, 2003 had nine cosponsors as of March 1.159 The
amendment effort, spearheaded by the Alliance for Marriage,160 is an
effort to (1) constitutionally define marriage as the union of a man and a
woman, and (2) prevent the courts from mandating the creation of a
quasi-marital status, such as Vermont civil unions. The text of the
amendment reads: “Marriage in the United States shall consist only of
the union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution or the
constitution of any State, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to
require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon
unmarried couples or groups.”161
On September 9, the Administrative Committee of the U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops lent their support to the federal marriage
amendment effort.162 In an October 2, 2003 press conference, twentyfour primarily conservative organizations joined together in a Coalition
to Protect Marriage, pledging to mobilize grassroots support for
traditional marriage in the months leading up to the 2004 elections.163
Various commentators have suggested that the Federal Marriage
Amendment is likely to play a prominent role in the 2004 presidential
and congressional elections, and may be included as part of the
Republican Party platform.164
2004 Mich. S.J.Res. 5; 2004 Minn. H.F. 2798; 2004 Miss. H. Con.Res. 56; 2004 Mo. S.J.Res. 29;
2004 Okla. H.J.Res. 1042; 2004 Utah H.J.Res. 25; 2004 Vt. P. 3; 2004 Wis. A.J.Res. 66.
157. U.S. H.R.J.Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003).
158. Bill Summary and Status for the 108th Congress, available at http://thomas.loc.gov
(H.J.Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003)).
159. Id. (Sen. J. Res. 26, 108th Cong.)
160. See http://www.allianceformarriage.org.
161. U.S. H.R.J.Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003).
162. Press Release, U.S. Catholic Bishops’ Administrative Committee Calls for Protection of
Marriage, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Sept. 10, 2003, available at
http://www.usccb.org/comm/archives/2003/03-179.htm.
163. Cheryl Wetzstein, Groups Pledge to Support Marriage; Say Gay Threat Demands
Action, WASHINGTON TIMES, Oct. 3, 2003, at A1.
164. See, e.g., Mark O’Keefe, An Uneasy Union: Religious Groups Come Out Against Gay
Marriages, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 16, 2003, at A4 (quoting a May 7 memo from pollster
Richard Wirthlin which identifies the Federal Marriage Amendment as “an ideal wedge issue” which
could work to the advantage of the Republican party in the 2004 elections); Mary Leonard,
Campaign 2004; Gay Marriage Stirs Conservatives Again, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 28, 2003, at A1
(quoting Republican National Committee Chairman Ed Gillespie as saying that a federal marriage
amendment may be “addressed in some form or fashion” in the party’s 2004 platform).
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B. Marital Benefits Legislation and Cases
As early as 1973, legal commentators had begun to suggest that
some status, alternative to marriage, might be created as a means of
extending certain spousal benefits to same-sex couples. Writing in the
Yale Law Journal, one commentator suggested:
Although private consensual homosexual activity might be legalized in
this country without creating many problems as it was in Great Britain,
the expansion of marriage to encompass homosexual couples would
alter the nature of a fundamental institution as traditionally conceived.
The Supreme Court may in the future decide that such alteration is
beyond its competence and therefore that marriage should be confined
to its present definition absent a positive move on the part of individual
state legislatures to broaden it. If such proves to be the case, particular
legal benefits available only to married couples might still be attacked
on equal protection grounds under both the Fourteenth and Twentyseventh Amendments.
If the Court granted homosexuals some of these benefits – without
compelling states to grant marriage licenses – it might eventually create
a ‘quasi-marital’ status. State legislatures might explicitly grant such a
status, and specify the attendant rights.165

Twenty-five years later, these words proved prophetic, as first the
Oregon Court of Appeals,166 then the Vermont Supreme Court,167 ruled
that same-sex couples were constitutionally entitled to the rights and
benefits of marriage. While clearly tied to the marriage controversy, as
with other aspects of the marriage debate, the manner in which that
connection is made becomes very significant.
Legislatures have long been in the business of linking benefits and
marriage, and are particularly suited to sever that connection where
appropriate for a particular benefit. For example, where state law bundles
numerous benefits and responsibilities as part of the marriage “package,”
a legislative body may evaluate each of those rights and determine which
in fact further the state’s interests in marriage, which are common to all
parents, and which should be made applicable to all individuals
regardless of marital or parental status. To the Vermont Court, however,
equipped only with the hammer of “common benefits,” every benefit,
protection, or responsibility of marriage suddenly became a nail, leaving
165. Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 588-89 (1973).
166. Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (finding the Oregon
Constitution to require state employers to treat domestic partners equally with married couples).
167. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (finding the Vermont Constitution to require that
same-sex couples be granted all the legal rights, benefits, and responsibilities of marriage).
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the court no room to consider whether certain functions of marriage
might still serve a valid purpose under state law, distinguishing marriage
from other relationships. Litigation thus becomes a blunt instrument, ill
equipped to respond to the exigencies of a given factual setting.
1. Domestic Partnerships
Unlike the debate over the definition of marriage itself, most of the
debate over spousal benefits for same-sex couples has in fact occurred in
legislative bodies. Nationally, a handful of states and various local
governments have extended some form of recognition to same-sex
partnerships. 168 These relationships often mirror various requirements for
marriage, but are narrower in scope than marriage.169 Usually established
under the rubric of “domestic partnerships,” most policies are limited to
employee benefits for unmarried partners of government employees.170 A
number of jurisdictions have also adopted “domestic partner registries,”
permitting same-sex couples to formally register their partnership,
though such registries often carry few substantive benefits.171

168. While some private employers also offer domestic partner benefits to their employees,
this article focuses on domestic partnership policies in the public sector. In the private sector, recent
reports from the Human Rights Campaign indicate that 5667 private employers offer spousal
benefits for the domestic partners of their employees, comprising approximately 0.11% of the
nation’s 5.3 million employers as documented in the U.S. Census Bureau’s 1997 Economic Census.
See “Company Summary: 1997 Economic Census” at 15, Table 1 United States Census Bureau,
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ec97/e97cs-1.pdf; “Domestic Partner Benefits,” Human
Rights Campaign, available at http://www.hrc.org/worknet/dp/index.asp. The numbers are
significantly higher among Fortune 500 companies, though still a minority as the Human Rights
Campaign counts 202 of the Fortune 500 that offer domestic partner benefits, approximately 40% of
the nation’s largest companies. In 1997, the City of San Francisco adopted a benefits plan requiring
private employers to offer domestic partner benefits in order to be eligible to compete for city
contracts. The cities of Los Angeles and Seattle subsequently adopted similar ordinances. Los
Angeles Admin. Code, Div. 10, Chap. 1, Art. 1, § 10.8.2; Seattle Mun. Code § 20.45.020. Five years
later, based on data showing that 75% of the 4500 businesses that offered domestic partner benefits
in 2002 did so in order to comply with the San Francisco city ordinance. San Francisco Human
Rights Commission, Five Year Report on the San Francisco Equal Benefits Ordinance, Nov. 14,
2002, at 1.
169. The definition of a domestic partner put forward by the Oregon Court of Appeals
contains many typical elements, though wide variation exists between jurisdictions. Tanner v. Or.
Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 439 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (defining “domestic partners” as (1)
“homosexual persons,” (2) “not related by blood closer than first cousins,” (3) “who are not legally
married,” (4) “who have continuously lived together,” (5) “in an exclusive and loving relationship,”
(6) “that they intend to maintain for the rest of their lives,” (7) “who have joint financial accounts,”
and (8) “joint financial responsibilities,” (9) “who would be married to each other if Oregon law
permitted it,” (10) “who have no other domestic partners,” and (11) “who are 18 years of age or
older”). See also William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States: A Review
and Critique, 2001 BYU L. REV. 961 (2001) (surveying 35 domestic partnership ordinances).
170. See William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States: A Review and
Critique, 2001 BYU L. REV. 961 (2001).
171. See id.
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Three states offer some form of legally recognized status that confers
certain legal rights and benefits upon same-sex couples. Hawaii was the
first, adopting its “reciprocal beneficiary” statute in 1997 as part of a
legislative compromise allowing the marriage amendment to move
forward. Under the reciprocal beneficiary law, any two adults who
cannot legally marry (including parent/child, roommates, siblings, etc.)
may enter into a reciprocal beneficiary relationship and receive sixty
statutory rights and benefits available to married couples, including
survivorship rights, health insurance, and joint property ownership.172
The most well known of the three systems exists in Vermont, where the
legislature adopted “civil unions” in 2000, extending to registered samesex couples all the legal benefits and responsibilities of marriage.173
Lesser known is the fact that Vermont also adopted a “reciprocal
beneficiary” statute in 2000.174 Unlike the civil union statute that
provides broad rights for same-sex couples, the reciprocal beneficiary
statute provides a smaller set of spousal benefits to close relatives who
are precluded from entering into a marriage or civil union due to their
relationship by blood or adoption.175 While more than 6,000 couples
(mostly from out-of-state) have now entered into a civil union, as of
August 2003 no couple had yet applied to establish a reciprocal
beneficiary relationship.176 Established in 1999, California’s “domestic
partnership” is by far the most populous of the various registries with
more than 23,000 registered domestic partners as of November 1,
2003.177 As initially established, domestic partners received hospital
visitation rights and health insurance coverage for dependents of state
employees.178 In 2001, the list of benefits was expanded to include
eligibility for stepparent adoptions, family and medical leave, standing to
bring a wrongful death lawsuit, and inheritance rights, among others.179
Even more recently, on September 19, 2003, California Governor Gray
172. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1 (2003); Hawaii’s Domestic Partner Law A Bust; Relatively
Few Sign Up for Country’s Broadest Benefits Package, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 25, 1997, at A14
(finding that only 296 couples had signed up for benefits, in contrast to the state’s estimate of 20,000
couples).
173. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2004). In Vermont, the adoption of civil unions did not
come without political controversy, including a “Take Back Vermont” campaign in the fall of 2000
that removed 20 pro-civil union legislators from office in November 2000. See Nancy Remsen,
Statehouse Sees Shift in Power, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Nov. 9, 2000.
174. Vt. Stat. Tit. 15, § 1301 (2004).
175. Id. at §§ 1301, 1303.
176. E-mail from Richard McCoy (Aug. 25, 2003) (on file with author).
177. Phone call with Special Filings Section of California Secretary of State (Nov. 3, 2003)
(reporting that of the 23,442 registered domestic partnerships, an estimated 90% have been issued to
California residents).
178. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. 588 (West).
179. 2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. 893 (West).
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Davis signed into law a bill which will make registered domestic partners
the legal equivalent of married spouses under all provisions of state law
when the bill takes effect on January 1, 2005.180
The Human Rights Campaign (HRC) reports that, as of November
2003, ten state governments extended benefits to domestic partners of
state employees.181 Though a precise tally is difficult to obtain, at the
local level, HRC counts approximately 166 cities and counties
throughout the United States that offer domestic partner benefits.182 This
number constitutes slightly less than 0.2 percent of the nation’s 87,525
units of local government as recorded by the 2002 Census of
Governments.183
Reports indicate that Berkeley, California became the first American
municipality to offer domestic partner benefits to its employees in
1984.184 Beginning in the mid-1990’s, as additional cities and counties
began to offer similar benefit ordinances, taxpayer challenges to these
ordinances were filed in a number of jurisdictions. With mixed results,
the lawsuits have commonly focused on two primary allegations: (1) that
the policies were outside the scope of municipal authority granted by
state law, and (2) that they infringed upon the exclusively state
legislative authority over domestic relations law.185

180. 2003 Cal. A.B. 205. Two lawsuits have been filed in a pre-implementation challenge to
the bill. The lawsuits allege the measure unconstitutionally contradicts the initiative statute defining
marriage as the union of one man and one woman that was overwhelmingly approved by California
voters on March 7, 2000. Suit Challenges Partners’ Rights Bill, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Sept.
23, 2003, at A16.
181. State Governments that Offer Domestic Partner Health Benefits, Human Rights
Campaign, available at http://www.hrc.org/worknet/dp/index.asp (including California, Connecticut,
Iowa, Maine, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington).
182. Local Governments and Quasi-Governmental Agencies That Offer Domestic Partners
Health Benefits, Human Rights Campaign, available at http://www.hrc.org/worknet/dp/index.asp (a
search for units of local government offering domestic partner benefits turned up 166 results,
including 83 cities and towns, 33 counties, as well as various school districts and special district
governments).
183. Government Organization, at 2, Table 2, 2002 Census of Governments (Dec. 2002),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/gc021x1.pdf (finding 87,525 total units of local
government, including 3,034 county governments, 19,429 municipal governments, and 16,504 town
or township governments, in addition to 13,506 school district governments, and 35,052 special
district governments).
184. See Governments Offering Benefits, Partners Task Force for Gay and Lesbian Couples,
available at http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-gov.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2003).
185. See, e.g., Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (Minn.
Sup. Ct. denied review) (invalidating ordinance); City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 265 Ga. 161, 454
S.E.2d 517 (1995) (invalidating ordinance); City of Atlanta v. Morgan, 268 Ga. 586, 492 S.E.2d 193
(1997) (affirming ordinance); Schaefer v. City & County of Denver, 973 P.2d 717 (Colo. Ct. App.
1998) (affirming ordinance); Crawford v. City of Chicago, 304 Ill. App.3d 818, 237 Ill. Dec. 668,
710 N.E.2d 91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (affirming ordinance); Connors v. City of Boston, 430 Mass. 31,
714 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 1999) (invalidating ordinance); Slattery v. City of New York, 179 Misc.2d
740, 686 N.Y.S.2d 683 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff’d as modified by 697 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1999) (affirming
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Other questions surrounding domestic partner ordinances have arisen
regarding the complex interplay between state and federal law. In San
Francisco, California, the ordinance requiring city contractors to offer
domestic partner benefits to their employees was found to be preempted
by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) with
respect to ERISA-covered health and pension plans.186 In Portland,
Maine, Catholic Charities filed suit in February 2003 making the same
arguments against a similar ordinance recently adopted by the City of
Portland.187
In April 2003, a Vermont legislative committee approved legislation
excluding civil union partners from the definition of “spouse” in statutes
governing the state’s Medicaid system. 188 Because federal law defines
spousal eligibility for Medicaid coverage in terms of marriage between a
man and a woman,189 the legislators expressed concern that Vermont law
recognizing civil union partners as “spouses” could jeopardize the state’s
federal Medicaid funding. Having received no definitive answer from
Washington, the state ultimately elected to rely exclusively on state
funding to cover Medicaid premiums for same-sex couples related by
civil union, rather than risk reliance on federal dollars which might
jeopardize the entire program.190
2. Benefits Litigation
For several years, litigation has produced an increasingly pronounced
rhetorical separation between marital status and marital benefits, as
ordinance); Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So.2d 1199 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 2000) (Fla. Sup. Ct.
denied review) (affirming ordinance); Arlington County v. White, 259 Va. 708, 528 S.E.2d 706
(2000) (invalidating ordinance); Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming
ordinance); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2001);
Heinsma v. City of Vancouver, 29 P.3d 709 (Wash. 2001); Pritchard v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist.,
242 Wis. 2d 301, 625 N.W.2d 613 (2001) (affirming ordinance); Tyma v. Montgomery County, 801
A.2d 148 (Md. 2002) (affirming ordinance); Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 809 A.2d 980 (Pa.
Commw. Ct., 2002) (invalidating ordinance).
186. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149, 1155
(N.D. Cal. 1998).
187. Tess Nacelewicz, Catholic Charities Sues City on Domestic Partner Issue, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD, Mar. 1, 2003, at 1A.
188. Associated Press, Vt. Panel’s New Medicaid Rules Said to Violate Civil Unions Law,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 19, 2003, at B2; David Mace, Critics Say Rule Change Violates Civil Unions,
TIMES ARGUS, Apr. 17, 2003.
189. 1 U.S.C. §7. (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and
wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”
Pub. L. 104-199, sec 1, 100 Stat. 2419 (Sep. 21, 1996)).
190. Darren M. Allen, Administration Shifts Civil Union Medicaid Stance, TIMES ARGUS, July
11, 2003.
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various plaintiffs have argued that they are constitutionally entitled to
marital benefits, while stopping short of claims for legal recognition of a
same-sex “marriage.” Until 1998, these claims were uniformly
unsuccessful.191
a. Hawaii and Alaska - wrapping up Baehr and Brause. Though earlier
benefits cases had been litigated, the distinction between marital status
and marital benefits may have been first highlighted in Alaska and
Hawaii after the adoption of the marriage amendments to their respective
state constitutions. In both Alaska and Hawaii, after constitutional
amendments effectively precluded their campaign for full legal
recognition of same-sex “marriage,” the plaintiffs or their amici
alternatively argued that principles of equality demanded same-sex
couples be accorded the rights and benefits of marriage, even if marital
status itself were to describe only opposite-sex couples.192 Both courts
sidestepped the question, however. The Alaska Supreme Court dismissed
the case on procedural grounds, determining that the plaintiffs had failed
to present an actual controversy,193 and the Hawaii Supreme Court only
hinted at a response to the arguments made by the ACLU in an amicus
brief, stating: “The plaintiffs seek a limited scope of relief in the present
lawsuit, i.e., access to applications for marriage licenses and the
consequent legally recognized marital status. Inasmuch as HRS § 572-1
is now a valid statute, the relief sought by plaintiffs is unavailable.”194
b. Oregon Court of Appeals - Tanner v. OHSU. In 1998, the Oregon
Court of Appeals became the first American court to find that an

191. Bailey v. City of Austin, 972 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998); Hinman v. Dep’t. of
Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1985) (holding state’s denial of spousal
dental insurance coverage to unmarried same-sex partners of state employees not unconstitutional);
Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding state
policy limiting employee dependent health insurance benefits to spouses and dependent children not
unconstitutional); Ross v. Denver Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 883 P.2d 516 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994)
(rejecting equal protection and due process challenge to denial of health insurance coverage for
same-sex partner of employee); Rutgers Council v. Rutgers, 689 A.2d 828 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997), cert. denied, 707 A.2d 151 (1998) (finding same-sex partner is not a “spouse” for purposes of
health insurance law and contract); Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska, No. S-10459 (Alaska
[date]).
192. Brause v. State, Dept. of Health & Social Services, 21 P.3d 357 (Alaska 2001); AkCLU
v. Alaska, No. S-10459 (Alaska Oct. 27, 1999) (case filed on behalf of eight same-sex couples
seeking a constitutional right to spousal employee benefits); Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394-05 (Dec.
9, 1999).
193. Brause v. State, Dept. of Health & Social Services, 21 P.3d 357, 358 (Alaska 2001).
194. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394-05 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999). David O. Coolidge has noted that
this suggestive language raises more questions than it answers with respect to marital benefits. The
Hawai’i Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning, and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19, 111 (2000).
Particularly, if marriage licenses are a narrow pursuit resulting in marital status, what is the broader
claim that the court may be anticipating? Id. Does it involve marital benefits as separated from
marital status? Id. The Court left these questions unclear. Id.
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unmarried couple had a constitutional right to marital benefits.195 In
Tanner, three lesbian employees of the Oregon Health Sciences
University applied for medical and dental insurance benefits on behalf of
their same-sex partners, affirming that they would have married their
partners were they permitted to do so under state law.196 In the summer
of 1996, the trial court found that the denial of benefits violated both an
employment discrimination statute197 and a constitutional provision
guaranteeing equal privileges and immunities to all classes of citizens.198
Moreover, the trial court attempted to define a “domestic partner” who
would be entitled to marital benefits. The court’s rather unwieldy
definition held that domestic partners would include “homosexual
persons not related by blood closer than first cousins who are not legally
married, who have continuously lived together in an exclusive and loving
relationship that they intend to maintain for the rest of their lives, who
have joint financial accounts and joint financial responsibilities, who
would be married to each other if Oregon law permitted it, who have no
other domestic partners, and who are 18 years of age or older.”199
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ultimately found no statutory
violation, but declared that same-sex couples constituted a suspect class
for purposes of the constitutional analysis under Article I, section 20 of
the Oregon Constitution.200 Having described same-sex couples as a
suspect class, the court also applied a disparate impact analysis, declaring
it irrelevant that the University had no intent to discriminate against
same-sex couples.201 In the final paragraphs of its opinion, the court
described the disparity: “Homosexual couples may not marry.
Accordingly, the benefits are not made available on equal terms. They
are made available on terms that, for gay and lesbian couples, are a legal
impossibility.”202 When the defendant university showed no interest in
appealing the decision, State Representative Ron Sunseri took the

195. Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). See also William C.
Duncan and David O. Coolidge, Marriage and Democracy in Oregon: The Meaning and
Implications of Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 503, 518-20
(2000).
196. Tanner at 438.
197. OR. REV. ST. § 695.030(1)(b) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of the sex of one
“with whom the individual associates,” which the court interpreted as a de facto prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
198. OR. CONST. art. I, § 20 (“No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of
citizens privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens.”); Tanner at 438-39.
199. Tanner at 439.
200. Id. at 447.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 448.
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unusual step of seeking a writ of mandamus requiring the Court of
Appeals to vacate its opinion.203 The Oregon Supreme Court refused to
consider the case.204
The Tanner ruling was narrow, applicable only to spousal benefits
for state university employees.205 Nonetheless, the analysis was a
precursor of that which would appear a year later in the Vermont
Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. State.206 While Tanner went
virtually unnoticed outside of a few legal circles, Baker would set the
state into political turmoil.
c. Vermont - Baker v. State. Although the Baker court explicitly
rejected the suspect class analysis adopted in Tanner,207 the basic
substance of the Baker opinion finds commonality with much of the
Tanner opinion. In Baker, the Court observed that “the marriage statutes
apply expressly to opposite-sex couples. Thus, the statutes exclude
anyone who wishes to marry someone of the same sex.”208 After reciting
a list of the governmental benefits that are tied to marriage, the Court
stated, “While other statutes could be added to this list, the point is clear.
The legal benefits and protections flowing from a marriage license are of
such significance that any statutory exclusion must necessarily be
grounded on public concerns of sufficient weight, cogency, and authority
that the justice of the deprivation cannot seriously be questioned.”209
Once having reviewed the various interests put forward by the state
in defense of the marriage statute, the Court concluded that “none of the
interests asserted by the State provides a reasonable and just basis for the
continued exclusion of same-sex couples from the benefits incident to a
civil marriage license under Vermont law. Accordingly, in the faith that a
case beyond the imagining of the framers of our Constitution may,
nevertheless, be safely anchored in the values that infused it, we find a
constitutional obligation to extend to plaintiffs the common benefit,
protection, and security that Vermont law provides opposite-sex married
couples.”210
203. Rep. Sunseri had argued that as a state legislator, his performance of his duties would be
impacted by the decision, and that the court could be required to vacate an incorrect ruling. For
additional information, see William C. Duncan and David O. Coolidge, Marriage and Democracy in
Oregon: The Meaning and Implications of Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University, 36
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 503, 518-20 (2000).
204. Order Denying Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Sunseri v. Court of Appeals (Or. Mar. 15,
1999) (No. S46055).
205. Tanner v. Or. Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d at 437.
206. Id. at 445-47.
207. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 878 n.10 (Vt. 1999).
208. Id. at 880.
209. Id. at 884.
210. Id. at 886.
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It was in the Baker court’s articulation of remedy that it became
startlingly clear that the Vermont Supreme Court had turned a marriage
controversy into a question of benefits.
Although plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief designed to
secure a marriage license, their claims and arguments here have
focused primarily upon the consequences of official exclusion from the
statutory benefits, protections, and security incident to marriage under
Vermont law. While some future case may attempt to establish that—
notwithstanding equal benefits and protections under Vermont law—
the denial of a marriage license operates per se to deny constitutionallyprotected rights, that is not the claim we address today.
We hold only that plaintiffs are entitled under Chapter I, Article 7, of
the Vermont Constitution to obtain the same benefits and protections
afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples. We do not
purport to infringe upon the prerogatives of the Legislature to craft an
appropriate means of addressing this constitutional mandate, other than
to note that the record here refers to a number of potentially
constitutional statutory schemes from other jurisdictions. These include
what are typically referred to as “domestic partnership” or “registered
partnership” acts, which generally establish an alternative legal status
to marriage for same-sex couples, impose similar formal requirements
and limitations, create a parallel licensing or registration scheme, and
extend all or most of the same rights and obligations provided by the
law to married partners. 211

The Baker court thus left the legislature with four options: (1)
propose a constitutional amendment which would effectively reverse the
Baker decision; (2) simply ignore the Court’s directive, likely resulting
in judicially imposed same-sex “marriage”; (3) adopt some parallel
system of spousal recognition for same-sex couples; or (4) include samesex couples within the existing statutory system governing marriage.
Faced with these options, a number of legislators unsuccessfully pursued
the first route, and the proposed constitutional amendment was
eventually defeated 17-13 in the Vermont Senate.212 Others favored full
recognition of same-sex “marriage,” an idea that proved politically
untenable.213 Cowed by the court’s authority, and also by the prospect of
the court’s retained jurisdiction over the case, the Legislature eventually
211. Id.
212. David O. Coolidge and William C. Duncan, Beyond Baker: The Case for a Vermont
Marriage Amendment, 25 VT. L. REV. 61, 77 (2000) (citing Journal of the Senate, Proposal 6, 65th
Gen. Assem. Bienn. Sess. (Vt.) (Apr. 18, 2000), at 2, available at http://
www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2000/journals/sj000418.htm.).
213. Id. at 74 (same-sex “marriage” legislation was defeated by a 125-22 margin, providing
political cover for many who eventually supported the civil unions legislation).
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approved a system of “civil unions,” over the strong objections of a
sizeable minority.214
There remain differences of opinion regarding the extent to which
Baker is properly classified as a benefits case, or whether it belongs in
the list of marriage litigation. For my purposes, I have included Baker on
both lists, having been filed as a marriage case and decided as a benefits
case. On its face, Justice Amestoy’s majority opinion goes out of its way
to remind the parties that the decision is not about the right to legal
recognition of same-sex marriage, but only about providing benefits for
same-sex couples.215 In reserving judgment on the question of marriage
licenses, it can be argued that the Baker court left open the possibility
that marriage, as an independent social institution, may represent
something greater than the accumulation of legal benefits attached to it.
Other commentators, however, have argued that the Baker decision itself
is in fact a reductionist redefinition of marriage, making marriage into
nothing more than a policy device by which to achieve certain social
ends and upon which to confer certain legal benefits.216 This alone, the
argument would continue, is a striking redefinition of marriage, perhaps
necessary to the inclusion of same-sex couples, though not in itself
requiring such inclusion.
In Tanner, the Oregon Court of Appeals became the first court to
constitutionally compel the extension of marital benefits to unmarried
same-sex couples. The Baker court took this reasoning and extended it in
an expansive ruling that applied to all marital benefits and
responsibilities available under state law. Begun as a challenge the
definition of marriage in Vermont and concluded as a dispute over
spousal benefits, Baker uniquely demonstrates the close doctrinal
relationship between marriage and benefits litigation.
d. New York – Levin v. Yeshiva. Additional cases have brought
marital benefits litigation to other states. In Levin v. Yeshiva
University,217 two female Yeshiva University students challenged a
university policy which established priority for married couples in
applications for certain student apartments maintained by the
university.218 The complaint alleged (1) that the married student housing
policy discriminated against unmarried students on the basis of their
marital status in contravention of state law and municipal code, and (2)

214. The civil unions bill ultimately passed the Vermont House by a 76-69 margin, and was
approved in the Senate on a 19-11 vote. Id. at 74, 78.
215. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886.
216. See Coolidge and Duncan, supra note 212, at 61-67.
217. 754 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. 2001).
218. Id. at 1101.
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that the policy had a disparate discriminatory impact against gay and
lesbian students in violation of New York City Code.219
The trial court and Appellate Division both rejected the disparate
impact claims, finding that the policy “had the same impact on nonmarried, heterosexual medical students as it had on non-married
homosexual medical students.”220 On further appeal, after briefly
disposing of the marital status claim, the New York Court of Appeals
applied a similar disparate impact analysis as was applied by the Oregon
Court of Appeals in Tanner, remanding the case to the trial court for a
factual determination of “whether [the University’s] housing policy has a
disparate impact that falls along the impermissible lines of sexual
orientation.”221 Moreover, the Court rejected the Appellate Division’s
reasoning, which found an equal impact upon unmarried opposite-sex
couples and unmarried same-sex couples.222
e. Recent benefits cases. More recently, cases filed in Indiana and
Montana have sought to replicate Tanner in other states. In Indiana, a
state employee applied for bereavement leave upon the death of her
lesbian partner’s father.223 The funeral leave policy provided three days
of paid leave upon the death of certain extended family members,
including relatives by marriage, thus creating certain benefits available
only to married persons.224 Claiming that the policy was discriminatory
as applied to gay and lesbian persons, the complaint alleged a violation
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution.225
The trial court concluded that the benefit statute did not discriminate
on the basis of sexual orientation, but rather distinguished between
classes of married and unmarried individuals.226 The court then adopted
the state’s argument, inter alia, that the marriage-based bereavement
leave policy was reasonable insofar as it provided an objective and easily
identifiable standard upon which to base employee benefits, relying on
the longstanding legal structure of marriage.227 On appeal, the court took
a more skeptical approach, summarily rejecting the state’s proffered
justifications for the policy and declaring simply, “[T]he policy exists to
219. Id.
220. Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 709 N.Y.S.2d 392, 393 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000), rev’d on appeal
754 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. 2001).
221. Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 754 N.E.2d at 1106.
222. Id. at 1105-06.
223. Cornell v. Hamilton, 791 N.E.2d 214, 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
224. Id. at 219.
225. Id. at 215.
226. Cornell v. Hamilton, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Entry of Summary
Judgment, 49D04 0002 CP 180 (Ind. Marion Super. Ct., July 15, 2002), aff’d on appeal, 791 N.E.2d
214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
227. Id.
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strengthen family relationships, and families are different today than they
once were.”228 Nonetheless, the court found that the plaintiff had
conceded a rational connection between marriage and the bereavement
policy, arguing only that it was discriminatory as applied to same-sex
couples. This framing of the question deprived the court of the
opportunity to decide “the close question of whether, in this age of
changing family relationships, the policy’s distinction based on marital
status is rational.”229 Finding no allegation that the marriage-based policy
had been applied in a discriminatory fashion against gay and lesbian
persons, the court upheld the constitutionality of the policy.230
Finally, in a case still pending before the Montana Supreme Court,
two University of Montana employees filed suit alleging that they had
been unconstitutionally denied the opportunity to obtain spousal benefits
for their unmarried partners.231
C. Interstate Marriage Recognition Questions
The adoption of civil unions legislation in Vermont gave practical
significance to the theoretical questions regarding interstate marriage
recognition widely discussed during the Baehr litigation in Hawaii. In
making Vermont the first American state to recognize same-sex partners
as “spouses” with all the rights, benefits and responsibilities of married
couples,232 the civil unions legislation raised real and immediate
questions regarding the legal status of couples who traveled to Vermont,
entered into a civil union, and then returned home to Boston, Boise, or
Birmingham. Like marriage, the civil union law contains no residency
requirement for applicants, and within a year, same-sex couples from
each of the 50 states had obtained civil union licenses in Vermont.233
After the first year, more than 75 percent of the more than two thousand
civil union licenses issued by the state of Vermont had been granted to
non-residents.234 As of August 1, 2003, more than 85 percent of the 5914
228. Cornell v. Hamilton, 791 N.E.2d 214, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that same-sex
couples can participate in childrearing).
229. Id. at 219.
230. Id. at 220.
231. Snetsinger v. Bd. of Regents, No. 03-238.
232. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1204(b) (2004) (“A party to a civil union shall be included in
any definition or use of the terms “spouse,” “family,” “immediate family,” “dependent,” “next of
kin,” and other terms that denote the spousal relationship, as those terms are used throughout the
law.”).
233. State of Vermont 2001 Vital Statistics at I-1, Vermont Department of Health (2001 Civil
Unions:
Place
of
Residence
of
Party
A
and
Party
B),
available
at:
http://www.healthyvermonters.info/hs/vital/2001/i01.htm.
234. Elizabeth Mehren, Gay Couples Do “Wedding” March to Vt., L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2001,
at
A1.
See
also
Civil
Union
Statistics,
MarriageWatch.org,
available
at
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civil union licenses granted by the Vermont Bureau of Vital Statistics
had been issued to non-Vermonters.235 After rising steadily for a time,
the ratio of new licenses granted to out-of-state residents appears to have
leveled off at around 90 percent.236 These recent statistics indicate that
there are now more than 5,000 couples from all across the nation with
civil union certificates, questioning whether those certificates will be
recognized by their home state.237
1. Principles of interstate marriage recognition238
Though filled with complex questions that may arise,239 the general
principles of interstate marriage recognition are relatively settled. While
courts virtually always recognize marriages performed in other states or
nations, 240 it has long been understood that they are under no
http://www.marriagewatch.org/media/cudata.htm (as of July 1, 2001, there had been 2258 civil
union licenses issued, including 1795 to out-of-state couples, and 463 to Vermont residents.).
235. E-mail from Bill Apao, Vermont Department of Health (Aug. 8, 2003) (on file with
author) (5914 civil unions, including 859 to Vermont residents); Fred A. Bernstein, Gay Unions
Were Only Half the Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at s.9 p.2 (reporting that 85% of civil union
licenses had been issued to out-of-state couples in April 2003).
236. In 2000, 78% of civil unions were issued to out-of-state couples, while that number
jumped to nearly 87% in 2001. See 2001 Summary of Vermont Civil Unions, Vermont Department of
Health, available at http://www.healthyvermonters.info/hs/vital/2001/cu.shtml. Though official 2002
data is not yet available, civil union data from February 1, 2002 and August 1, 2003 indicates that
90.2% (2130) of the 2361 civil unions issued during that period went to non-Vermonters. See Civil
Union Statistics, MarriageWatch.org, available at http://www.marriagewatch.org/media/cudata.htm.
Coupled with U.S. Census 2000 data showing 1,933 same-sex couples in Vermont, these numbers
suggest that approximately 24% of same-sex couples in Vermont entered into civil unions law
during the first year the law was in effect. By August 2003, that ratio jumped to 44%, though the
census data does not account for same-sex couples who may have relocated to Vermont since 2000.
Tavia Simmons and Martin O’Connell, Married Couple and Unmarried Partner Households: 2000,
Table 2, at 4, U.S. Census Bureau (Feb. 2003).
237. See Bernstein, supra note 235.
238. Others with expertise in the area of conflicts of laws have ably set forth the relevant
principles in other articles. As one without particular expertise in this area, my purpose here is
simply to articulate the general principles and highlight areas raising more specific questions. See,
e.g., Ralph U. Whitten, Exporting and Importing Domestic Partnerships: Some Conflict-of-Laws
Questions and Concerns, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1235 (2001); Richard Myers, Same-Sex ‘Marriage’
and the Public Policy Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 45, 47 (1998); see also Patrick L. Borchers,
Baker v. General Motors Corp.: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of Non-Traditional
Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147 (1998).
239. For example, questions concerning interstate recognition of divorce decrees, adoptions,
or other legal judgments that may be dependent upon or incident to a marriage valid in one state.
240. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 63 (“a marriage which is valid under the law of the state or
country in which it is contracted will generally be recognized as valid”); see also Donlann v.
Macgurn, 55 P.3d 74, 77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (“Unless strong public policy exceptions require
otherwise, the validity of the marriage is generally determined by the law of the place of marriage.”);
Hudson Trail Outfitters v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Empl. Servs., 801 A.2d 987, 989 (D.C.
2002) (“[A] marriage’s validity is to be determined by the law of the state where the marriage took
place, unless the result would contradict or offend public policy.”); Xiong ex rel. Edmondson v.
Xiong, 648 N.W. 2d 900, 903 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (“Marriages valid where celebrated are valid
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compulsion to do so when a particular marriage would contradict a
state’s public policy. 241 As Professor Richard Myers noted in 1998
regarding the hypothetical case of a couple from one of the contiguous
48 states (or Alaska) who might travel to Hawaii to obtain a marriage
license, “The answer to this question ought to be quite easy: the home
state is not required to recognize such a union by either normal conflicts
doctrine or by the Constitution, and in fact there are very legitimate
reasons that the home state might well invoke to refuse to recognize such
a union.”242 Thus, if a marriage valid in Vermont is deemed contrary to
the public policy of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania need not recognize the
marriage.
Historically, marriage laws in the United States have been marked by
a general uniformity and only minor differentiation, giving courts many
opportunities to recite the public policy doctrine and few opportunities to
apply it. The occasional conflicts that have arisen usually involve issues
such as marriageable age,243 first cousin marriages,244 and common law
marriages.245 In each of these cases, courts have in most cases recognized
the foreign marriage if valid where contracted, even where not permitted

everywhere, except those contrary to the law of nature and those which the law has declared invalid
upon the ground of public policy,” quoting In re Estate of Campbell, 51 N.W.2d 709 (Wis. 1952));
People v. Schmidt, 579 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (“Michigan follows the general rule
that ‘a marriage valid where it is contracted is valid everywhere.’” (citations omitted)); Bogardi v.
Bogardi, 542 N.W.2d 417 (Neb. 1996) (“The general rule is that the validity of a marriage is
determined by the law of the place where it was contracted; if valid there, it will be held valid
everywhere, and conversely, if invalid by the lex loci contractus, it will be invalid wherever the
question may arise.”).
241. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 64 (“The general rule that a state will recognize as valid a
marriage that was valid in the state in which it was contracted is subject to an exception where
recognition in the forum state would be contrary to the public policy of that state.”).
242. Richard Myers, Same-Sex ‘Marriage’ and the Public Policy Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 45, 47 (1998); see also Patrick L. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors Corp.: Implications for
Interjurisdictional Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147 (1998);
Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights
and Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., Mar. 3, 2004 (written
statement of Prof. Lea Brilmayer, Howard M. Holtzmann Professor of International Law, Yale Law
School).
243. See, e.g., State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1957) (recognizing validity of
Mississippi marriage of 13-year-old girl even though not permitted under Arkansas law); Wilkins v.
Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1958) (declining to recognize an underage marriage of New Jersey
residents which was valid in Indiana, the state in which it was solemnized); Keith v. Pack, 187
S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. 1945) (recognizing underage marriage of Tennessee residents which was valid in
Georgia, the state in which it was solemnized).
244. See, e.g., Mason v. Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing validity of
Tennessee marriage between first cousins, even though not permitted under Indiana law).
245. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1961) (declining to
recognize a common law marriage entered into in the District of Columbia by New Jersey residents);
People v. Schmidt, 579 N.W.2d 431, 466 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing common law marriage
entered into in Alabama).
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under the laws of the receiving state.246 Marriages from other nations are
also generally granted recognition, though courts have on various
occasions refused to recognize bigamous or incestuous marriages as
contrary to state public policy.247
For purposes of this choice of law question, courts are not strictly
bound by a Full Faith & Credit analysis under Article IV of the
Constitution.248 In 1998, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed this
distinction between choice of laws and interstate recognition of
judgments in Baker v. General Motors Corp., explaining:
Our precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws (legislative
measures and common law) and to judgments. “In numerous cases this
Court has held that credit must be given to the judgment of another
state although the forum would not be required to entertain the suit on
which the judgment was founded.” The Full Faith and Credit Clause
does not compel “a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its
own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is
competent to legislate.. . . A court may be guided by the forum State’s
“public policy” in determining the law applicable to a controversy.249

This public policy doctrine is embodied in both Restatements on
Conflicts of Laws. Under the First Restatement, a marriage contrary to
the public policy of either party’s home state was invalid in the cases of
polygamous marriages, incestuous marriages, certain interracial
marriages, and other marriages explicitly denied recognition by statutory
enactment.250 The Second Restatement, published in 1971, modifies the
First Restatement’s rule by deleting reference to specific marriages held
invalid and replacing it with a more general choice of law statement
based on a state’s relationship to the parties and the marriage:
(1) The validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of the
state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant

246. The most common exception to this practice arises where the case involves residents of
the state who left the state in order to circumvent the state’s marriage laws. See, e.g., Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1961).
247. See, e.g., People v. Ezeonu, 588 N.Y.S. 2d 116 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (declining to
recognize a second Nigerian marriage as a defense to a charge of rape); Catalano v. Catalano, 170
A.2d 726 (Conn. 1961) (declining to recognize Italian marriage between Connecticut resident and
his Italian niece).
248. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 62 (“Such effect as may be given by one state to the marriage
laws of another state is merely because of comity, or because public policy and justice demand the
recognition of such laws, and no state is bound by comity to give effect in its courts to laws which
are repugnant to its own laws and policy.”).
249. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 663-64 (1998) (quoting Milwaukee County
v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306
U.S. 493, 501 (1939)).
250. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 132 (1934).
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relationship to the spouses and the marriage under the principles stated
in § 6.251
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the
marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless
it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of
the marriage.252

Exercising its authority under the Full Faith & Credit provision of
the United States Constitution,253 Congress in 1996 adopted the Defense
of Marriage Act, which, in part, provides that no state shall be compelled
to recognize a “marriage” between persons of the same sex, even if that
marriage was lawful in the state in which it was contracted.254
In reliance upon this authority, 38 states have adopted statutory or
constitutional provisions barring recognition of foreign marriages
between persons of the same sex.255 The first of these was adopted in
Hawaii in 1994 in an unsuccessful attempt to head off the Baehr
marriage litigation.256 Utah followed in 1995 out of concern that Hawaii
would soon recognize same-sex “marriages.”257 Fifteen additional states
adopted marriage recognition (mini-DOMA) laws in 1996,258 with 9
more states following their lead in 1997.259 By the end of 1998, a total of
30 states had adopted affirmative policies denying recognition of same-

251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (stating that a court will
first “follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law,” and where there is no applicable
statute, setting forth seven factors to be considered in determining choice of law).
252. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAW § 283.
253. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
254. Pub. L. 104-199 sec. 2, 100 Stat. 2419 (Sep. 21, 1996) codified at 28 U.S.C. §1738C
(1997).
255. Supra note 20.
256. 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217. See David O. Coolidge & William C. Duncan, State
Marriage Recognition Statutes, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 6 (1998).
257. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1995); Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4 (Supp. 1998).
258. ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-101 (1991); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-30 (1996); IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (Michie
1996); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (1996); H.B.
5662 (Mich. 1996); S.B. 937 (Mich. 1995); MO. REV. STAT. § 451.022 (1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
51.1.2 (1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43-3, 43-3.1 (1996); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West
Supp. 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-10 (Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Supp. 1997);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (1996).
259. H.B. 1004, 81st G.A. (Ark. 1997); S.B. 5, 81st G.A. (Ark. 1997); H.B. 147 (Fla. 1997);
House Enrolled Act 1265, 110th G.A. (Ind. 1997); Laws 65, 118th Leg. (Me. 1997); S.F. 830 (Minn.
1997); S.B. 2053 (Miss. 1997); H.B. 323 (Mont. 1997); S.B. 2230, 55th Leg. (S.D. 1997); Acts 365
(Va. 1997).
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sex “marriage.”260 In the five years since then, eight additional states
have adopted marriage recognition statutes.261
2. Marriage recognition litigation
To date, there have been only two direct challenges to defense of
marriage legislation at the state or federal levels. The first case, the only
reported challenge to the federal Defense of Marriage Act, arose in the
Seventh Circuit, when Robert Mueller on two occasions attempt to file a
joint tax return with his partner, Todd Bates, arguing that the Defense of
Marriage Act unconstitutionally refused to recognize his same-sex
marriage. In the first case, Mueller’s DOMA challenge was dismissed
because the Defense of Marriage Act was not in effect for the tax years
in question. When the case returned to the Seventh Circuit for subsequent
tax years, the court dismissed the case for lack of standing, finding that
no state had licensed the purported same-sex “marriage,” and it is
impossible to recognize a marriage license that has not been granted.262
The second challenge comes in the form of a lawsuit filed on April
30, 2003 against the state of Nebraska, alleging that the Nebraska
marriage amendment violates the federal constitutional guarantee of
equal protection and constitutes an unconstitutional bill of attainder.263
Rather than directly challenge the same-sex marriage ban, the lawsuit
focuses on the second sentence of the amendment, which prohibits
recognition of any same-sex civil union or domestic partnership, arguing
that the amendment erects a higher bar to recognition of same-sex
domestic partnerships than would be required to enact opposite-sex
domestic partnerships.264 Lambda Legal and the ACLU on behalf of

260. H.B. 152 (Ala. 1998); H.F. 382 (Iowa 1998); H.B. 13 (Ky. 1998); H.B. 1130, 55th Leg.
(Wash. 1997).
261. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (Proposition 22, approved Mar. 7, 2000); NEB. CONST. art. I, §
29 (Initiative Measure 416, approved Nov. 7, 2000); Nev. Question 2 (approved Nov. 5, 2002); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 124, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2003); MO. REV. STAT. §
451.022 (L.2001, H.B. 157, § A) (reenacted after being stricken on procedural grounds); 2004 Ohio
Laws 61 (H.B. 272); W.VA. CODE § 48-2-603 (Acts 2001, c.91, eff. Sept. 1, 2001); S.D. CODIFIED.
LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (Laws 2000, Ch. 233, § 1, eff. May
26, 2000).
262. Mueller v. C.I.R., 2002 WL 1401297 (not selected for publication in the Federal
Reporter) (also warning Mr. Mueller that “if he continues to file frivolous tax appeals, he faces the
possibility of sanctions”).
263. Complaint, Citizens for Equal Protection v. Att’y Gen., 290 F.Supp.2d 1004 (D. Neb
2003) (No. 4:03CV3155).
264. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (“The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union,
domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in
Nebraska.”).
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three Nebraska non-profit educational and advocacy organizations filed
the case jointly.265
On June 30, 2003, the Nebraska Attorney General’s office moved to
dismiss the litigation, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the
Article III case or controversy requirements for subject matter
jurisdiction of federal courts.266 The state also sought to dismiss the bill
of attainder claim for failure to state a cause of action.267 Federal District
Judge Joseph Bataillon denied the state’s motion to dismiss on
November 10, 2003, and the case is currently pending before the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nebraska.268
As these two cases demonstrate, standing is a major hurdle in any
constitutional challenge to state or federal marriage recognition (DOMA)
provisions. Moreover, standing will remain an issue unless or until one
or more states issues a marriage license to a same-sex couple, giving
them a potential grievance in the event another state refuses to recognize
their marriage.
3. Civil union recognition cases
In the absence of any American jurisdiction granting marriage
licenses to persons of the same sex, there have been few grounds upon
which to challenge the recognition provisions of the various state
marriage statutes. The handful of cases that have arisen have done so in
the context of Vermont civil unions.269 Though not directly a question of
“marriage” recognition, several couples have sued to have their Vermont
civil union certificates recognized as proof of marriage or spousal status
in other states.270
Because “civil unions” are not “marriages,” this litigation requires
courts to address a two-pronged inquiry.271 The first prong of analysis
requires some identification of a civil union – deciding whether a
Vermont civil union is the same as a marriage. If not, a state may
conclude that it has no structure or basis under which to recognize the
265. The organizations include Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. (CFEP), Nebraska
Advocates for Justice and Equality (NAJE), and ACLU Nebraska. Complaint, ¶¶ 8-10, Citizens for
Equal Protection v. Att’y Gen., 290 F.Supp.2d 1004 (D. Neb 2003) (No. 4:03CV3155).
266. Motion to Dismiss, Citizens for Equal Protection v. Att’y Gen., 290 F.Supp.2d 1004 (D.
Neb 2003) (No. 4:03CV3155).
267. Id.
268. Robynn Tysver, Court OKs Suit on Same-Sex Union Ban, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Nov. 11, 2003, at 2B.
269. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Rosengarten v. Downes, 71
Conn. App. 372, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); Langan Estate of Spicehandler v. St.
Vincent’s Hosp. of N.Y., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 48-49.
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civil union. That is, in a state which has no system of civil unions
(currently including all 49 of Vermont’s neighboring states),272 a court
has three choices in dealing with the civil union: (1) recognize the civil
union as a marriage; (2) recognize the civil union as some other
domestic, contractual, or equitable relationship; or (3) refuse to recognize
the civil union. If a court elects to treat a civil union as either a marriage
or some other form of relationship, the court must then proceed to the
second prong of analysis. Under the second prong, the court must
determine whether the civil union is entitled to recognition under either
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution or
under common law principles of comity.
To date, three reported opinions (two intermediate appellate opinions
and one trial court ruling) have addressed these questions,273 while court
documents and newspaper reports identify several additional cases that
have not led to a published opinion.274 In each of the published cases, the
court has recognized that it is not automatically required to recognize a
civil union, but that it must undertake an analysis of state public policy to
determine whether the union is consistent with the policy of the
jurisdiction.
The first of these cases, Burns v. Burns, arose in the context of a
child custody consent decree in which the divorced Darian and Susan
Burns had agreed that neither spouse would have an overnight adult
guest in the home while the children were present, unless the parent and
the third party were “legally married” or closely related.275 In July 2000,
Susan Burns and her lesbian partner, Debra Freer, traveled to Vermont
where they obtained a civil union license and subsequently returned to
their home in Georgia.276 Following their civil union, Susan and Debra
deemed themselves married for purposes of the consent decree, and two
months later Darian Burns filed a motion for contempt, alleging violation
of the consent decree.277 The trial judge ruled that Susan Burns was in
272. Under a recently adopted California law, California would begin recognizing civil unions
within its “domestic partnership” provisions in January 2005. 2003 Cal. AB 205.
273. Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Rosengarten v. Downes, 71 Conn.
App. 372, 802 A.2d 170 (2002); Langan Estate of Spicehandler v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. of N.Y., 765
N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
274. First Amended Complaint, 10 at ¶ 65-67, Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49D13-0211-PL001946 (Ind. Marion Super. Ct. [date needed]) (the recognition claim was dropped in the second
amended complaint); Hall v. Beauchamp, 833 So.2d 123 (table) (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 2002)
(unanimously affirming the circuit court order denying recognition of a Vermont civil union);
Melissa Drosjack, Gay Couple Won’t Get Texas Divorce, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar. 28, 2003;
Judge Dismisses Request for Same-Sex Divorce, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 2, 2003, at 9
(the plaintiff later withdrew his case when the judge ordered a further hearing on the matter).
275. Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 48.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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violation of the consent decree, though declining to hold her in contempt.
On appeal, Susan argued that she and her partner were married in
Vermont, and that their Vermont “marriage” was entitled to full faith and
credit in Georgia.278 Additionally, they argued that the Georgia
Protection of Marriage Act violated federal constitutional guarantees as
well as a right to privacy under the state constitution.279
Among the various groups filing amicus curiae briefs in the case
were two groups of legislators. A group of 69 Vermont legislators filed a
brief in support of the father, explaining that even under Vermont law, a
civil union and a marriage are distinct legal entities,280 while a group of
Georgia legislators presented a comprehensive analysis of Georgia public
policy with respect to same-sex unions.281
The Georgia Court of Appeals issued its ruling on January 23, 2002,
holding that (1) a civil union is not a marriage under Vermont law, and
thus not entitled to recognition as a “legal marriage” under Georgia
law;282 (2) even if the lesbian couple had obtained a “legal marriage”
under Vermont law, same-sex marriage was contrary to the public policy
of Georgia and statutorily denied recognition;283 and (3) the right to
privacy under the Georgia Constitution did not require affirmative legal
recognition of the couple’s partnership.284
The Georgia Court of Appeals subsequently denied a motion for
reconsideration,285 and the Georgia Supreme Court denied review of the
case.286
In Burns, because the underlying consent decree used the precise
language of “legally married,” the court did not address the question of
whether a civil union is entitled to alternative recognition as some form
of non-marital domestic or contractual relationship. That was precisely
the question faced by the Connecticut Court of Appeals, however, in

278. Brief for Appellant at 6, Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (No.
A01A1827).
279. Id. at 7.
280. Brief of Amici Curiae Members of the Vermont Legislature, Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d
47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (No. A01A1827).
281. Brief of Amici Curiae Members of the Georgia Legislature, Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d
47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (No. A01A1827).
282. Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 48-49.
283. Id. at 49.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 47. The motion for reconsideration argued that the court, having already concluded
that Vermont civil unions were not marriages, should not have proceeded to discuss the effect of a
same-sex marriage under Georgia law. Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration, Burns v. Burns, 560
S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (No. A01A1827).
286. Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga.App. Jan 23, 2002), reconsideration denied (Feb 07,
2002), certiorari denied (Jul 15, 2002).
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Rosengarten v. Downes.287 On December 31, 2000, Glen Rosengarten, a
Connecticut resident, and Peter Downes, a New York resident, entered
into a Vermont civil union.288 When their relationship ended several
months later, Peter Rosengarten sued for divorce in Connecticut Superior
Court.289 Because Vermont law requires that at least one party be a 12month resident of Vermont before a divorce is granted,290 they were
ineligible for a divorce under Vermont law and sought to dissolve their
civil union in a Connecticut court.
Much like the Burns court, the Connecticut Court of Appeals was
forced to determine whether a civil union was the same as a marriage,
and, if so, whether an out-of-state marriage between persons of the same
sex could be recognized in Connecticut. Complicating the question
somewhat, however, was the fact that a catchall clause in the Connecticut
domestic relations act gave broad jurisdictional authority to the court to
resolve other domestic relations matters not explicitly addressed in the
statute.291 Though Connecticut does not have a marriage recognition
statute that expressly precludes recognition of same-sex “marriages,” the
court reached much the same result as the Georgia Court of Appeals had
in Burns, relying heavily on a clause in the adoption code that stated that
same-sex “marriage” was contrary to state public policy.292
In his petition for certiorari to the Connecticut Supreme Court,
Rosengarten argued that Connecticut policy favored recognition of a
Vermont civil union,293 but that even if a civil union were not recognized
as a marriage under Connecticut law, the family court still had
jurisdiction in the case under the catchall provision giving the court
jurisdiction over all domestic relations matters.294 On September 19,

287. 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
288. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 1, Rosengarten v. Downes, 71 Conn. App. 372, 802 A.2d
170 (2002) (Ct. A.C. No. 22253). There was no brief filed by the Appellee in the case, as he did not
oppose the initial divorce petition.
289. Id. at 1. The complaint was filed on July 11, 2001.
290. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 592 (requiring six months’ residency prior to filing, and 12
months’ residency prior to issuance of the divorce decree).
291. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-1(17) (2003) (extending jurisdiction over “all such other
matters within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court concerning children or family relations as may
be determined by the judges of said court.”).
292. Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 179 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (quoting CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46a-81r, which provides that “nothing in [the ban on sexual orientation discrimination] shall
be deemed or construed . . . to authorize the recognition of or the right of marriage between persons
of the same sex.”).
293. Petition for Certification at 5, Rosengarten v. Downes, 71 Conn. App. 372, 802 A.2d 170
(2002) (No. 16836).
294. Id. at 10.
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2002, the Supreme Court accepted the case for review,295 weeks before
Peter Rosengarten died after a struggle with lymphoma and HIV.296
Following Rosengarten’s death, which legally dissolved the civil union,
the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, leaving the appellate
decision intact.297
The final reported opinion dealing with interstate recognition of a
Vermont civil union comes from a New York trial court, the only court
thus far to extend marital recognition to a Vermont civil union in a
reported opinion.298 Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital is a wrongful death
case in which the partner of the deceased Neal Spicehandler is seeking to
pursue a wrongful death claim against St. Vincent’s Hospital. Without
declaring the Vermont civil union a full equivalent of marriage for all
cases, the trial judge found no expression of New York public policy
opposing same-sex unions, and ruled that the Vermont civil union gave
Spicehandler’s partner standing to sue as a spouse in the context of the
wrongful death suit.299 This case is currently pending on appeal before
the New York Appellate Division.
Several additional civil union recognition cases have been filed,300
including a West Virginia trial court that dissolved a civil union in a
divorce proceeding. According to news reports, Marion County Family
Court Judge David P. Born dissolved the civil union of Misty Gorman
and Sherry Gump in a divorce judgment issued on December 22, 2002.301
In granting the divorce, Judge Born described the situation of the two
women as “citizens of West Virginia in need of a judicial remedy to
dissolve a legal relationship created by the laws of another state.”302
A second case was filed in Florida, in a situation similar to that
addressed by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Burns v. Burns.303 When

295. Order on Petition for Certification to Appeal, Rosengarten v. Downes, 71 Conn. App.
372, 802 A.2d 170 (2002) (No. 16836) (entered Sept. 19, 2002). The question on review was, “Did
the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction to
dissolve a civil union entered into pursuant to the laws of Vermont?” Id.
296. Lindsay Faber, Attorneys Hope Death of Plaintiff Won’t End Gay Divorce Lawsuit,
GREENWICH TIME, Nov. 9, 2002. In an interesting twist, the article also indicates that Rosengarten’s
attorney is the current husband of Rosengarten’s ex-wife.
297. Order, Rosengarten v. Downes, 71 Conn. App. 372, 802 A.2d 170 (2002) (No. 16836)
(entered Dec. 31, 2002) (“It is hereby ordered, sua sponte, that the captioned matter is dismissed as
moot.”).
298. Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
299. Id. at 422.
300. See, e.g., Jyoti Thottam, Why Breaking Up is So Hard to Do, TIME, Mar. 8, 2004, at 31
(describing civil union divorce cases in Iowa and Texas).
301. Bernstein, supra note 237, at s.9p.2; Sam Hemingway, Texas Case Provides Exposure to
Civil Union Law, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Apr. 6, 2003, at 1B.
302. Bernstein, supra note 301.
303. Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
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Robert Hall and Traci Beauchamp divorced in 1999, their settlement
contained a provision forbidding the presence of overnight guests other
than “close family members” while the children were in the home.304
Robert Hall and his same-sex partner subsequently traveled to Vermont
where they entered into a civil union, and returned to petition the court
for a modification of the divorce judgment. The court concluded that
there had been no change in circumstances sufficient to justify a
modification of the order as: (1) the former husband had voluntarily
consented to the initial order; (2) Florida law does not recognize
marriages between persons of the same sex; and (3) the Vermont civil
union does not establish a “special category” rising to the level of a
substantial change in circumstances.305 On appeal to the 1st District
Court of Appeals in Tallahassee, the case was unanimously affirmed
without a published opinion.306
Another matter arose, at least briefly, in Indiana, where the plaintiffs
in the same-sex “marriage” litigation included an alternative claim for
recognition as spouses pursuant to their Vermont civil union license.307
Following the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss, which argued that
such unions were against Indiana public policy and that Indiana had no
duty to recognize a Vermont civil union, the plaintiffs amended their
complaint and dropped the recognition claim.308
A fourth case arose in Texas, while the Texas Legislature was
considering legislation that would eventually make Texas the 37th state to
adopt marriage recognition (DOMA) legislation. On March 3, 2003,
Beaumont Family Court Judge Tom Mulvaney granted a divorce decree
to two Texas men who had obtained a civil union license in Vermont.309
When news of the divorce decree hit the newspapers, Texas Attorney
General Greg Abbott intervened, asking the judge to reconsider the
decree. Abbott argued, “Because these two men were never married
under either Vermont or Texas law, they cannot legally petition for
divorce under the Texas Family Code. The court’s final decree of divorce

304. Editorial, A Ruling in Need of Reconsideration, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 1, 2002, at
2D.
305. Hall v. Beauchamp, No. 98-09CA, (Fla. 14th Cir. Ct. Dec. 2001) (order regarding
modification of final judgment).
306. Hall v. Beauchamp, 833 So.2d 123 (table) (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 2002) (unanimously
affirming the circuit court order denying recognition of a Vermont civil union).
307. Complaint, Morrison v. O’Bannon, No. 49D11-0208-PL-1415 (Ind. Marion Super. Ct.
(filed Aug. 22, 2002)).
308. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49D11-0208-PL-1415
(Ind. Marion Super. Ct. (filed Feb. 3, 2003)).
309. Sam Hemingway, Texas Case Provides Exposure to Civil Union Law, BURLINGTON FREE
PRESS, Apr. 6, 2003, at 1B.
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is void as a matter of law.”310 Taken aback by the sudden interest in the
matter, the judge withdrew the divorce decree and ordered the parties to
brief the question of whether a Texas court had jurisdiction to dissolve a
Vermont civil union.311 Faced with the prospect of opposition from the
Attorney General’s office, the two men withdrew their petition for the
divorce.312
III. CONCLUSION— THE ROAD AHEAD
A. The Future of Marriage Litigation
In this article, I have attempted to provide a snapshot of the marriage
debate as it stood at the beginning of 2004. By the time this article goes
to press, there will undoubtedly be much more that has occurred, but
such is the nature of a snapshot.
While the legal debate continues to intensify in courtrooms and
legislative chambers in Washington D.C. and across the country, the
future of the marriage debate lies in the opinion of the American public.
A majority which favors same-sex marriage will ultimately see that
policy reflected in the law; a sufficiently motivated majority supporting
marriage as a means of providing children with both mothers and fathers
will overcome even the most stubborn court judgment with constitutional
amendments. To date, the marriage debate has been driven largely by
elite opinion; the past six months have opened the debate to the
American public.
B. Dynamics of Public Opinion
Writing in the September 11, 2001 edition of The Advocate, Evan
Wolfson, now president of the New York-based Freedom to Marry,
described his public relations strategy, outlining three elements of a
campaign to win same-sex marriage. The first of Wolfson’s three
elements acknowledges the value of strategic lawsuits and legislative
efforts, but casts its focus on “enhanced public education and outreach
work.” The second element of the strategy requires “development of a
clear and sophisticated understanding of what demographics we need to
reach in order to firm up our 30%–35% base and soften up and move the
15%–20% of the public who are movable.” Finally, the third aspect of
310. Melissa Drosjack, Gay Couple Won’t Get Texas Divorce, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar.
29, 2003, at A39.
311. Judge Dismisses Request for Same-Sex Divorce, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 2,
2003, at 9.
312. Bernstein, supra note 302.
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the Wolfson plan calls for the “deployment of resources, trainings,
messages, messengers, and vehicles to help non-gay and gay partners in
different states and constituencies communicate transformative
information and enlist additional non-gay support.”313 Each of these
strategic goals is focused primarily on winning the marriage debate in the
arena of public opinion.
In 2001, Wolfson described a 30-35 percent base of public support
for same-sex marriage.314 CNN and Time pollsters first asked
respondents about “marriages between homosexual men and woman” in
1989, finding 23% support for same-sex marriage.315 When Gallup
conducted its first poll on same-sex “marriage” in 1996, 27 percent of
respondents supported the legal recognition of same-sex unions, while 68
percent of respondents opposed the proposition.316 Over the next 6 years,
polling data continued to show a slow rise in public acceptance of samesex unions.317 By July 2003, 38 percent of respondents to a Pew Research
Center poll endorsed same-sex marriage, while opposition decreased to
53 percent. In the short term, at least, early July 2003 appears to be the
high water mark in public support for same-sex marriage. Between July
and November 2003, support for same-sex marriage dropped 6
percentage points according to identical Pew Research Center polls,
negating much of the increase of the past six years.318 Other polls have
shown a similar reversal, with a December 2003 Gallup poll finding a
10-point rise in opposition to same-sex marriage since June 2003, while
support for same-sex marriage dropped to its lowest level since 1996.319
It remains to be seen whether these recent poll results point to the
start of a new trend or merely a short-term backlash against unpopular
judicial decisions of 2003. Polls gauging intensity of opinion give further
insight into the dynamics of the debate, suggesting that opinions are
beginning to solidify, particularly among opponents of same-sex
marriage. A Pew Research Center poll released in November 2003 shows
35 percent of respondents “strongly opposed” to same-sex marriage,
313. Evan Wolfson, All Together Now, THE ADVOCATE, Sept. 11, 2001.
314. Id.
315. The same poll found 69% of Americans opposed to same-sex marriage. Karlyn Bowman,
Attitudes About Homosexuality: AEI Studies in Public Opinion, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE,
at 21 (Feb. 13, 2004), available at www.aei.org/doclib/ 20040122_Homosexuality3_Rocky.pdf
(compiling polling data related to same-sex unions).
316. Id. at 19.
317. Id.
318. Id.; see also Joshua K. Baker, Summary of Opinion Research on Same-Sex Marriage
(1988-2003), iMAPP Policy Brief, Dec. 5, 2003, available at http://www.imapp.org.
319. Bowman, supra note 311. A February 2004 Gallup poll showed a 5-point increase in
support for same-sex marriage since December, highlighting the fluid nature of public opinion at this
time. Id.
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compared to just 9 percent who “strongly favor” the idea. A National
Public Radio poll from December 2003 found 48 percent of respondents
strongly opposed to same-sex marriage, while 17 percent strongly
favored the idea.320
Another gauge of public opinion has come in the form of ballot
referenda in Alaska, Hawaii, California, Nebraska, and Nevada. In each
of these five states, voters have approved measures defining marriage as
the union of a man and a woman by margins of more than 20 percentage
points.321 With a cumulative turnout of 9.4 million voters over a threeyear period from 1998 through 2000, American voters in the five states
supported these measures by a cumulative 63.1 percent to 36.9 percent
margin.322
These numbers represent the future of marriage in the United States.
Ironically, a Massachusetts court’s effort to remove the marriage
question from the realm of public debate has thrust marriage to a
prominent place in public discourse. Though laws and judicial decisions
will continue to play an important educational role in our culture, public
policy is a lagging indicator of public opinion and will necessarily follow
the consensus of the American people. The marriage debate taking place
today is a healthy debate, informing and instructing not only individual
Americans, but also our national conception of marriage.

320. National Public Radio, Frequency Questionnaire, q.13 (Dec. 10-15, 2003).
321. Hawaii, Legislative Power to Reserve Marriage to Opposite-Sex Couples, Nov. 3, 1998,
p.004, middle column, available at http://www.state.hi.us/elections/reslt98/general/ 98swgen.html
(Yes: 69.2% (285,384); No: 28.6% (117,827); Blank: 2.0% (8,422); Overvotes: 0.2% (887)); Alaska,
Measure No. 2, Constitutional Amendment Limiting Marriage, Nov. 3, 1998, available at
http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/elect98/general/results.htm (Yes: 68.1% (152,965); No:
31.9%
(71,631));
California,
Proposition
22,
Mar.
7,
2000,
available
at
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/sov/2000_primary/measures.pdf (pages 153-155) (Yes: 61.4%
(4,618,673); No: 38.6% (2,909,370)); Nebraska, Initiative Measure 416, Nov. 7, 2000, available at
http://www.sos.state.ne.us/Canvass2000/416and417.pdf (Yes: 70.1% (477,571); No: 29.9%
(203,667); Nevada, Question 2, Nov. 7, 2000, available at http://sos.state.nv.us/nvelection/
2000General/ElectionSummary.htm (Yes: 69.6% (412,668); No: 30.4% (180,077); Nevada,
Question 2, Nov. 5, 2002, available at http://sos.state.nv.us/nvelection/2002General/
ElectionSummary.htm (Yes: 67.2% (337,197); No: 32.8% (164,573)).
322. The approximate totals from these combined sources is 5,947,261yes votes; 3,482,572 no
votes. Total votes: 9,429,833 (using Nevada figures from the higher voter turnout in 2000).

